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Abstract 
 It may be a bad idea to waste resources, but is it illegal? Legally 
speaking, what does “waste” even mean? Though the concept may appear 
completely subjective, this Article builds a framework for understanding 
how the law identifies and addresses waste.  
 Drawing upon property and natural resource doctrines, the Article 
finds that the law selects from a menu of five specific, and sometimes 
competing, societal values to define waste. The values are: 1) economic 
efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future generations, 4) 
stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns. The law recognizes 
waste in terms of one or a combination of these values.  
 After identifying waste, the law seeks to eliminate it via targeted 
anti-waste provisions, which follow one of three approaches. First, “usage-
veto” measures empower selected parties to halt perceived wasteful 
changes to resource uses. Second, “market-facilitating” measures prevent 
economic waste by encouraging and correcting markets. Third, 
“sustainability” measures proscribe wasteful overconsumption of resources 
fundamental to human and ecosystem flourishing. 
 Through this framework, the Article synthesizes seemingly disparate 
property and resource doctrines into a coherent legal approach to the idea 
of waste. This overarching understanding of legal waste explains how 
individual anti-waste provisions originate and operate. Further, the waste 
framework serves as a practical tool for analyzing whether anti-waste laws 
remain in touch with current resource contexts and societal preferences. 
Finally, it offers theoretical insight about how anti-waste provisions work 
cumulatively to inject a necessary adaptability into property law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We all know one thing about waste: it is bad.1 It is hard to find the 
individual generally in favor of wasting something.2 Beyond that, however, 
opinions begin to diverge about what constitutes waste, and the term 
“waste” becomes difficult to define. Depending on the factual context or 
one’s values, the same action may or may not be considered waste. 
 Consider the example of an apple tree.  Letting apples fall from the 
tree unharvested may be waste to some. Using the apples as decoration 
rather than eating them or donating them to the hungry may be waste in 
another sense. Allowing people to pick from the tree for free instead of 
selling the apples is a different form of waste. Alternatively, allowing the 
tree to remain instead of planting a different crop, say wine-grapes, could be 
waste in a sense. Even maintaining the tree instead of cutting it to make way 
for a highway or shopping mall may be waste to another. Then again, none 
of the above necessarily constitutes waste. 
 Variations of waste abound, and to indulge one more example, Marc 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right To Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS 
IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 91 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
(“[E]verybody knows that waste is bad; this is, in fact, largely what the word means”). 
2 See id. at 76 (“Anglo-American society has never liked waste, in moral or 
consequential terms . . .”). 
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Reisner recounts a memorable instance in his western-water classic, 
Cadillac Desert: 
 
"You're from the Park Service, aren't you?"  Mulholland demanded 
more than asked. 
"Yes, I am," said Albright.  "Why do you ask?" 
"Why?" Mulholland said archly.  "Why? I'll tell you why.  You have 
a beautiful park up north.  A majestic park.  Yosemite Park, it's called.  You've 
been there, have you?" 
Albright said he had.  He was the park's superintendent. 
"Well, I'm going to tell you what I'd do with your park.  Do you want 
to know what I would do?" 
Albright said he did. 
 "Well, I'll tell you.  You know this new photographic process they've 
invented?  It's called Pathe.  It makes everything seem life like.  The hues and 
coloration are magnificent.  Well, then, what I would do, if I were custodian 
of your park, is I'd hire a dozen of the best photographers in the world.  I'd 
build them cabins in Yosemite Valley and pay them something and give them 
all the film they wanted.  I'd say, "This park is yours.  It's yours for one year.  I 
want you to take photographs in every season.   I want you to capture all the 
colors, all the waterfalls, all the snow, and all the majesty.  I especially want 
you to photograph the rivers.  In the early summer, when the Merced River 
roars, I want to see that.'  And then I'd leave them be.  And in a year I'd come 
back and take their film, and send it out and have it developed and treated by 
Pathe.  And then I would print the pictures in thousands of books and send 
them to every library.  I would urge every magazine in the country to print 
them and tell every gallery and museum to hang them.  I would make certain 
that every American saw them.  And then,” Mulholland said slowly, with what 
Albright remembered as a vulpine grin, “and then do you want [to know what] 
I would do?  I'd go in there and build a dam from one side of that valley to the 
other and stop the goddamned waste!"3 
 
Mulholland’s view may seem outdated, even repugnant, to some but 
rational or possibly morally mandated to others, and there can be such 
vehement difference of opinion over the principle of waste because the idea 
has no ethically neutral definition. It is an essentially contested concept that 
varies by individual.   
Identifying waste is not solely an individual enterprise, though. In 
fact, through its entire history American law has attempted to define and 
eliminate waste. From common law to statute and across a number of 
different contexts, our legal system has wrangled with sorting out what is 
waste and how best to prevent it.   
One might call these attempts to define and deal with waste “anti-
waste” measures, and they are the focus of this Article. Though anti-waste 
                                                 
3 MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT, 91-92 (Penguin 1993) (emphasis added). 
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measures offer insight into both property theory and practical resource 
management, scholarship has yet to consider our various anti-waste 
doctrines collectively or holistically. While legal concepts of waste have 
intrigued scholars since the days of Blackstone,4 the existing literature tends 
to address only select doctrines in relative isolation. For example, the 
common-law property doctrine of “waste” (hereinafter referred to as 
“landlord-tenant waste”5) has received most of the attention, and notable 
scholars such as Thomas Merrill, Richard Posner, and Jed Purdy have 
examined it.6 Addressing a different facet of waste, Edward McCaffery has 
explored how the concept of wasteful expenditures fits into notions of 
property and how taxation might address such waste.7  Finally, Joseph Sax 
and Lior Strahelivitz have discussed different sides of the waste coin by 
addressing, respectively, protections for culturally important property and 
owners’ rights to destroy property.8   
Building from the existing scholarship, this Article broadens the 
discussion of waste and anti-waste laws. It looks at legally cognizable waste 
more globally, and it considers anti-waste measures across the spectrum of 
property and natural resources law, seeking an overarching understanding 
of how the law identifies and addresses waste.9 Additionally, by assembling 
and synthesizing anti-waste measures, this Article challenges assumptions 
that property law is reluctant or unable to deal with waste.10  
                                                 
4 See, e.g., John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MISSOURI  
L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2007). 
5 The doctrine is commonly referred to simply as “the law of waste.” See, e.g., Thomas 
W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property 
Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2011).  However, since some distinguishing label is 
necessary to differentiate this particular waste doctrine from the other concepts of waste 
discussed, this Article will use landlord-tenant waste despite the fact that this is not a 
widely accepted name for the doctrine. 
6 See id.; Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on the Law of Waste, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1095 (2011); Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A 
Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006).  
7 See generally McCaffery, supra note 1 
8 See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 
117 YALE L. J. 781 (2005).  
9 This Article does not limit its consideration of anti-waste provisions only to those 
doctrines that explicitly use the term “waste.” Rather, it considers how the law identifies 
and addresses concepts of waste, regardless of whether the term is used. See discussion 
infra Part II. While a survey of the use of the term “waste” throughout American 
jurisprudence would also be valuable, that is a project for another article. 
10 For example, Edward McCaffery suggests that the law essentially does not address 
“non-urgent” waste, such as seemingly poor choices to spend resources on economically-
desirable but non-essential ends (e.g. luxury goods instead of pressing needs). See 
McCaffery, supra note 1 at 86, 89. He is not alone in this regard. See, e.g., Larissa Katz, 
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the contested 
concept of waste and its interplay with property principles. Next, Part II 
asserts that the law recognizes waste based on examining two factors: 
perceived resource context (i.e. whether a resource is perceived as over- or 
under-used) and specific societal values. To identify waste, the law first 
acknowledges a perception of resource over- or under-use. Next, the law 
adopts one or more of the following (sometimes competing) values: 1) 
economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future 
generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns. The 
law then defines waste by applying the chosen value (or combination of 
values) to the perceived resource context. This framework of adopting 
societal values from a specific menu and applying the values to a perceived 
resource context offers an overarching understanding of how the law 
identifies legally cognizable waste. Part III adds to this framework by 
explaining how anti-waste provisions develop in response to instances of 
legally cognizable waste and operate to address them. Examining a broad 
array of property and natural resource doctrines, this Part finds anti-waste 
provisions are not scattered, divergent, ad hoc policies. Rather, approaches 
to combatting waste fall consistently into three categories: usage vetoes, 
market-facilitating measures, and sustainability measures. Usage-veto 
provisions empower selected parties to halt perceived wasteful changes to 
resource uses; market-facilitating measures prevent economic waste by 
encouraging and correcting markets; and sustainability measures proscribe 
wasteful overconsumption of resources fundamental to human and 
ecosystem flourishing. Finally, Part IV explores the theoretical and practical 
implications of this waste framework. It suggests that the adaptable concept 
of waste brings responsive agility to the otherwise ponderous realm of 
property doctrines, allowing resource management regimes to keep in step 
with changing resource perceptions and societal values. It then deploys the 
waste framework as a tool for evaluating individual anti-waste measures as 
well as for informing broader property concepts. 
    
I. PROPERTY AND THE CONTESTED CONCEPT OF WASTE  
 Autonomy figures centrally into concepts of property ownership.11 
                                                                                                                            
Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 
1444, 1448 (2013) (“While the law might prohibit certain uses of property, the story goes, 
it has no business scrutinizing an owner's reasons for choosing among otherwise permitted 
uses.”). However, Parts II.B.2 and III.C of this Article offer instances of the law 
intervening to police this very concept of waste.  
11 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 275, 311 (2008) (“freedom is the key justificatory reason for ownership”); Henry E. 
Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American 
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Thus interests in property or resources can be described as “bundles of 
sticks” that typically include not only the right to exclude others but also the 
right to use (or not use) property.12 As the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas instructs, generally one must not use property in such a way as 
to injure the lawful rights of one’s neighbors,13 but beyond that our laws 
leave a property owner great latitude. Latitude so great, in fact, that 
throughout the history of Roman, English, and American law, property 
owners’ rights included even the right to destroy property.14 As Larissa 
Katz has put it, “[o]wnership's defining characteristic is that it is the special 
authority to set the agenda for a resource.”15 
For the most part, a property owner’s latitude in using his or her 
property does not cause concern about too much destruction of property or 
about resources not being used in valuable ways. Self-interest typically 
drives property owners to use resources in societally desirable ways and to 
forego exercising their rights to destroy or leave unused valuable property.16 
Thus, for the most part the law takes a laissez faire approach, compelling no 
particular use of property or resources.17 To take the example of a privately 
owned wilderness, “[p]roperty law is seen as essentially neutral, neither 
encouraging nor discouraging wilderness destruction, except in the limited 
sense of facilitating owner autonomy.”18 Thus, “[p]roperty law is primarily 
concerned not with what so-and-so may or may not do with Blackacre, but 
with who decides what so-and-so may do.”19  
 However, in some limited instances property law’s laisez-faire 
approach causes concern, particularly when it leads to “waste” of 
                                                                                                                            
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (“the owner usually can use the 
property for a variety of uses without answering to outsiders.”). 
12 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 16 (2d ed., 2012) 
13 See, e.g.,  57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 89 
14 See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 787-88; McCaffery, supra note 1 at 76; Katz, supra 
note 11 at 313. 
15 Katz, supra note 11 at 290. See also Katz, supra note 10 at 1450 (“Owners have the 
standing to resolve what I will call the Basic Question: what (in their view) constitutes a 
worthwhile use of a thing.”).   
16 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347 (Papers & Proc 1967). 
17 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 
798 (2009) (“the important, if often implicit, assumption in much of the literature on 
property's role in incentives and allocation, [is] namely the utilitarian default that 
preferences are value neutral.”)   
18 John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 519, 520 (1996). 
19 James Y. Stern,  Property's Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 294 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
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resources.20  In some such instances, the law intervenes with anti-waste 
measures that, to borrow Katz’s phrasing,21 circumscribe the owner’s 
special authority to set the agenda for a resource and steer resource use in a 
particularly preferred (i.e. non-wasteful) direction. These laws may 
originate at federal or state levels, may stem from common law or statute, 
and may apply to a variety of different scenarios.  Nonetheless, they all find 
common purpose by seeking to avoid the specter of waste, however defined.   
Attempts to prevent waste, though, inject a degree of chaos into 
property laws.  Instead of allowing property to organize around concepts of 
autonomy or agenda-setting authority,22 anti-waste laws introduce a new 
guiding principle fraught with subjectivity. Waste is an essentially contested 
concept, and navigating by it can lead to any number of endpoints. 
For example, one of the more commonly held understandings of 
waste stems from Locke’s concepts of divine justice and morality.23 These 
ideas of waste usually entail avoiding destruction or underuse of something 
of value. By way of illustration, “under a Lockean conception of waste, it is 
improper to kill a wild animal and then leave it to rot in the forest.”24 This is 
the case even if one owns the animal as property. From this Lockean 
perspective, “waste refer[s] to the dissipation or destruction of a permanent 
physical asset,”25 and while self-interest normally prevents such actions,26 
concern about this idea of waste persists, particularly in arguments for 
curtailing property owners’ rights to destroy their property. 27 
 However, a more utilitarian conception of waste might find no 
objection to the same behavior that Locke would condemn. Working with 
the same illustrative example of killing a wild animal and leaving it to rot in 
the forest, from a utilitarian perspective to kill a feral pig, because it might 
                                                 
20 Cf. Katz, supra note 10 at 1461 (“Ownership, unlike other positions of authority, 
does not rely on the special expertise or unique suitability of a particular holder of a right to 
make decisions affecting a thing”). 
21 See Katz, supra note 11 at 290. 
22 Autonomy has been seen as a principle and central aim of property law, which 
protects the rights of relatively stable and predictable agenda-setter for a resource, namely, 
the owner.  See supra sources cited in note 11.  Granted, “autonomy” itself is a malleable 
concept. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75 
(2010). 
23 See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 285, 308 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (1690) (“As 
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may 
by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs 
to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”). 
24 Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 789. 
25 McCaffery, supra note 1 at 77.  
26 See, e.g., id. 
27 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 786, 820, 784. 
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ravage cropland,28 and to leave it to rot in the forest, because one does not 
enjoy eating wild pig, would not necessarily constitute a form of waste. 
From a similar perspective, one might criticize laws mandating preservation 
of historic buildings (laws that some might view as preventing one form of 
waste, i.e., the alteration of great architecture29) as wasteful themselves in 
the sense that they “can obscure the social waste that results from excessive 
preservation or insufficient creation.”30   
Moreover, as one refines the utilitarian perspective with a more 
economically oriented approach, the waste calculus might further change.  
For example, to kill a feral pig to prevent crop damage and not eat it as a 
matter of taste is fine, but given that some treat wild pig as a delicacy31 and 
are willing to pay for it,32 then not at least retrieving and selling the pig 
might constitute waste.33 In such a case the failure to realize the gains from 
trade between willing buyers and willing sellers results in a form of 
economic waste.34 Thus one might identify a “wasteful nonuse” through 
“failing to exploit economic opportunities fully,”35 or, more vernacularly, a 
variation of waste embodying the idea that “one man’s trash is another 
man’s treasure.”  
Then again, the prospect of bringing the pig out of the woods and 
trying to sell it might represent a “waste of time” for the hunter. To cast this 
in economic terms, there is an opportunity cost in retrieving and selling the 
pig,36 and if the price for wild pig is not sufficiently high to preclude the 
                                                 
28 Many states have attempted to eradicate feral pigs for just this reason.  See, e.g., 
$1M Pilot Project Aims to Take Out Feral Pigs, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1m-pilot-
project-aims-take-out-feral-pigs.  
29 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
30 Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 821. 
31 See, e.g., Wild Boar: Time to Pig Out, 
http://westernfarmpress.com/management/feral-hog-income-opportunity-hunters-meat-
processors 
32   See, e.g., Feral Hog Income Opportunity for Hunters, Meat Processors, 
http://westernfarmpress.com/management/feral-hog-income-opportunity-hunters-meat-
processors 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., RICHARD IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 14 (Princeton 2005) 
(“[T]rading can improve the welfare of all the participants to a trade. Owing to diminishing 
marginal utility and the fact that individuals do not all have the same preferences for goods, 
an arbitrary allocation of goods to individuals is usually not as good as the allocation that 
individuals choose if given the opportunity to trade.”) 
35 Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 792. 
36 See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 121 (illustrating opportunity costs in terms of 
going to a baseball game by noting that the out of pocket costs of attending a baseball game 
are “ticket plus the costs of transportation and parking” while the opportunity cost of going 
to the ballgame “is that you did not spend your money and time engaging in the next best 
thing you could have done.”).  
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hunter from spending her time doing something else, then the hunter is 
worse off for not leaving the pig. From the hunter’s subjective standpoint, it 
is a waste (i.e. not worth her time) to take any action but leave the pig to rot. 
Moreover, since the market price of the pig would not be as high as the 
price that the hunter puts on her time, then retrieving it would impose a 
deadweight loss37 and create an overall negative utility value—wasting the 
hunter’s time and diminishing net societal wellbeing.38  
Conversely, from the standpoint of an individual without sufficient 
food or a society concerned with food availability, the hunter’s leaving the 
pig rather than taking some measure to add it to the food supply39 might be 
considered waste, regardless of the hunter’s subjective valuation of the cost 
of her time. This view of waste eschews the subjective, endogenous 
standpoint of the hunter40 and instead focuses on external, exogenous 
prioritization of resource uses. Thus, market-based valuation would not be 
entirely relevant, and instead waste would be identified “as the relatively 
nonurgent expenditure of scarce resources,” particularly on luxury, leisure, 
or other non-essential items.41 Such an approach to waste disapproves of 
“frivolous, or excessive consumption [or] poor choices [from an external 
viewpoint] of how to spend time or value.”42 This concept of waste 
downplays individual utility values and instead focuses on externally 
imposed concepts of optimal resource use.43 Thus, though the hunter may 
subjectively value her time as not worth retrieving a pig, this individual 
utility value would not be the relevant measure; instead an external 
(arguably objective) standard might determine that the hunter’s action of 
shooting and leaving the animal are excessively indulgent as a form of 
                                                                                                                            
In addition to this opportunity cost, there are also a transaction costs associated with 
selling the pig. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1-3, 6-8, 
13-19 (1960). 
37 IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 70 (explaining deadweight loss as “a loss to one person 
not offset by a gain to others.”) 
38 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-15 (7th ed. 
2007) 
39 Cf. Rock Creek Park Sharpshooting Operation Yields 20 Deer available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-01/local/38190208_1_deer-populations-
sharpshooting-operation-rock-creek-park (describing an operation to reduce the deer 
population in Washington, D.C.’s Rock Creek Park, where twenty deer were killed and the 
meat was donated to the hungry). 
40 This standpoint is traditionally that of utilitarian and economic theories of property.  
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 17. 
41 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 77. 
42 Id. at 86. 
43 Put another way, this concept calculates opportunity costs from a third-party 
perspective. 
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luxury or leisure, making the action wasteful.44 Such a conception of waste 
“is not constrained by self-interest” as other forms of waste might be.45 
Alternatively, one may move entirely away from a Lockean, 
utilitarian, economic, or frivolous-consumption calculation of waste. If so, 
then perhaps killing a pig and leaving it to rot might serve an expressive 
function, say if done in the presence of a new business partner, if done as a 
statement about the destructive power of guns, or if intended as a 
commentary about animal welfare policy.  In this case, one might prioritize 
the “expressive characteristics of property destruction” over the material 
property itself and thereby find no waste.46  Lior Strahilevitz offers one 
example of such expressive behavior in “the Taliban's destruction of the 
Buddhas of Bamiyan despite outcry from foreign governments and offers 
from museums to purchase some of the works.”47 From the Taliban’s point 
of view, selling the Buddhas may have been a wasted opportunity to make a 
major statement.48  
Finally, even without the expressive message, a “Blackstonian, 
absolutist notion of ownership”49 would find no waste in a property owner’s 
non-use or even destruction of property at his choosing.50 Thus, unlike the 
Lockean disapproval of killing a wild animal and leaving it to rot in the 
forest, under a Blackstonian view, such would not be wasteful, even if done 
at a whim, assuming that the killer owned the animal and the right to kill it.   
                                                 
44 This is the same idea that one might “waste time” by watching reality television 
instead of reading great works of literature, regardless of the fact that one may derive much 
greater utility from the television than the book. 
45 See, e.g., id. at 77. See also Davidson, supra note 17 at 767-68 (“One important, if 
frequently unstated, assumption underlying much of the diverse literature in this utilitarian 
and economic tradition is that the demand being satisfied through the legal institution of 
property is essentially self contained. This follows from the proposition in neoclassical 
economics that the decision to consume is endogenous, and that production follows the 
consumption function. The corresponding assumption in the literature is that people 
generally disregard others in consuming, focusing exclusively on their own internally 
generated needs.”). 
46 See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 823-24. 
47 Id. at 826-27. Strahilevitz goes on to describe the act further: “This destruction had 
an obvious religious motivation and meaning. These were not irrational acts of destruction; 
they were rational acts that conveyed unmistakable and attention-getting messages. The 
fact that the cash-strapped Taliban spurned purchase offers from foreigners shows how 
much it valued the expressive opportunity.” Id. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. at 816. 
50 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,  at 
Book III, Chapter 14 (“If a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit 
whatever waste his own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable or 
accountable for it to anyone.”). See also McCaffery, supra note 1 at 76 (discussing this 
Blackstonian conception of waste).  
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While these various examples illustrate some of the more common 
conceptions of waste, the chronicle is by no means exhaustive; in fact, it 
may represent a rather narrow band in possible ways to think about waste.51 
Nonetheless, the examples help demonstrate that the concept of waste 
resists independent, objective, normative content.  Rather, it is an 
essentially contested concept that can vary from one individual to the next.  
 
II. LEGALLY COGNIZABLE WASTE 
While possible theoretical conceptions of waste vary vastly, not all 
of these moral or philosophical views find legal expression via anti-waste 
laws.52 The law does not respond to or even recognize every idea of waste. 
Rather, in seeking to identify and avoid waste, the law embraces a relatively 
narrow set of waste concepts as legally cognizable.53 This Part builds a 
framework for understanding exactly how the law identifies waste that is 
sufficient to trigger a legal response.  
The law recognizes waste based the convergence of two factors: 1) 
perceived resource context and 2) specific societal values. To identify 
waste, the law first assesses the perceived resource context, determining if 
external, physical information suggests that a particular resource is over-
used or under-used. Next, the law adopts one or more of the following 
values: 1) economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future 
generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns. 
Reflecting more internal, abstract concepts,54 these societal values serve as 
guides for evaluating the merits of resource uses. As explained further 
below, some of these values (such as human flourishing, concern for future 
generations, and ecological concerns) complement each other sufficiently 
that they may work in combination. Other values take such fundamentally 
competing views on the merits of resource uses that they rarely harmonize 
and function more singularly (e.g. economic-efficiency values versus 
                                                 
51 For example, each of these illustrations is limited to an anthropocentric approach. 
52 Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1409, 1409 (2012) (“To be sure, explicitly, or more frequently implicitly, private law 
theories do recognize the gap between values that should guide us as moral agents and 
values that should be entrenched in law.”). 
53 Id. (“Given that law backs up its normative prescriptions with coercive power, at 
least in a liberal legal system its demands are typically more modest than those of 
morality.”). 
54 Of course, there is some interdependence and circularity inherent here—perception 
of resource context is necessarily influenced by one’s values and one’s values are bound to 
change based on perception of the surrounding physical world.  Nonetheless, despite the 
fact that the two factors can inform each other, they maintain an independence and 
descriptive usefulness based on their overall external versus internal and physical versus 
abstract properties.  
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stability and consistency values). Finally, after establishing the perceived 
resource context and relevant societal value (or combination of values), the 
law defines waste by applying the chosen value(s) to the perceived resource 
context.  
This framework of applying specific societal values to perceived 
resource contexts offers an overarching understanding of how the law 
identifies waste. Certainly different combinations of specific values and 
perceived resource contexts can lead to vastly divergent substantive 
concepts of waste,55 but the law’s procedure for identifying waste remains 
constant across values, contexts, resources, and circumstances.  
Moreover, the primacy of perceived resource context and specific 
societal values gives legal anti-waste measures a distinction from other 
aspects of property law. This is not to say that anti-waste measures are 
completely discrete from other regulations on property use, such as zoning, 
to take one example. Rather, anti-waste measures differ more in degree than 
in kind.  However, it is the elevated attention to perceived resource context 
and specific societal values that unifies anti-waste doctrines, and the fact 
that otherwise disparate doctrines share these common, distinctive concerns 
makes their comparisons both theoretically interesting and practically 
useful.56  
For example, most property principles take little enduring account of 
scarcity and thus little enduring account of perceived resource context.  The 
theory goes that property rights arise as a response to scarcity,57 but once 
property rights are established, property’s concern with scarcity largely 
ends. Certainly scarcity might affect the market price of property,58 but the 
law is, for the most part, hands-off in that regard. With legally cognizable 
                                                 
55 Though the paper will take up many examples of the variety of waste doctrine, a 
leading natural resources casebook, JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
AND POLICY 747 (2d ed. 2009), highlights a particularly cogent example. “In the East, to 
‘waste’ water is to consume it needlessly or excessively. In the West, to waste water is not 
to consume it – to let it flow unimpeded or undiverted down rivers.” Id. (emphasis 
original). 
56 See discussion infra Part IV. 
57 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 32 (1988) 
(“Scarcity...is a presupposition of all sensible talk about property....[S]o long as it obtains, 
individuals (either on their own or in groups) are going to disagree about who is to make 
which use of what.”); Davidson, supra note 17 at (“If a perspective on property might be 
said to have achieved dominance in contemporary theory, it is the basic utilitarian and 
economic perspective that sees the institution of property primarily as a response to 
problems posed by scarcity.”); RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 741 (“After all, the 
catalyst for all natural resources law is scarcity.”); POSNER, supra note 38 at 38 (2007) (“if 
a resource is valuable but not scarce (a paradox?) the creation of property rights does not 
serve an economizing function,”). 
58 See generally IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 83-88. 
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waste, however, perceptions of relative resource scarcity are central. In fact, 
the law’s distaste for waste stems largely from the idea of scarcity.59  
Similarly, waste concepts break from the ordinary property law 
mold by elevating other specific societal values above that of autonomy.  As 
discussed above, property law normally prioritizes autonomy and defers to 
the agenda-setting authority of the property owner,60 but anti-waste 
measures that direct resource uses limit this individual autonomy.  This is a 
key feature of anti-waste provisions: that they remove some of the owner’s 
private agenda-setting authority and invest that authority in some other 
party, sacrificing a degree of agenda-setting authority in service of the 
specific societal values identified above.  
This Part examines in more detail how the dual consideration of 
perceived resource context and specific societal values gives anti-waste 
provisions their character, both in distilling legally cognizable waste from 
the essentially contested philosophical concept of waste and in 
distinguishing legal anti-waste provisions from other property law 
doctrines.   
 
A. Perceived Resource Context 
 
Perception of scarcity is central to legal conceptions of waste.  With 
no resource scarcity, current or future, there can be no waste, at least not in 
the eyes of the law.61  An infinite resource permits no such concept. Thus, 
evaluation of the relative abundance or scarcity of a resource is a 
fundamental consideration for legally cognizable waste. Abundance or 
scarcity is also a physical, quantitatively measurable, external fact, so 
theoretically this is objectively determinable.  However, it is the perception 
of relative abundance or scarcity, rather than the absolute underlying fact, 
that most impacts conceptions of waste.    
                                                 
59 Cf. POSNER, supra note 38 at 27 (“One should not be surprised that in a world of 
scarce resources waste should be regarded as immoral”). 
60 There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g. Joseph William Singer, 
No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 
1283 (discussing limitations on autonomy in the case of public accommodations). 
61 This is the case, at least, with physical property. In the intellectual property context, 
one might conceive of waste even with relatively non-rival, and thus non-scarce, 
intellectual property goods, for example if there is production of the goods that leads to no 
benefit. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
299 (1988).   
While perceived resource context (i.e. scarcity) is not as applicable in considering 
waste of intellectual property, the specific societal values discussed later in this Article help 
inform legal ideas of waste for both physical and intellectual property. The balance of this 
Article will focus on treatment of waste for physical property and reserve a fuller treatment 
of intellectual property for another article.     
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Legally cognizable waste concepts are built not just on scarcity; 
rather they also include the relationship of resource use to relative scarcity.  
For example, if a resource is perceived to be abundant, over-use is less 
likely to be a concern, and if a resource is not in demand for use, its 
abundance is of less concern.  Thus, it is a use-to-scarcity ratio that truly 
informs legal waste, and this Article will refer to this ratio as “perceived 
resource context.” Three perceived resource contexts impact waste 
determinations: satisfactory use, under-use, and over-use.  
Satisfactory use does not lead to perceptions of legally cognizable 
waste. Anti-waste measures respond to displeasure at perceived resource 
misuse, and as far as legal anti-waste measures are concerned, without 
sufficient displeasure no waste is occurring. So, if there is satisfactory use, 
then there is no need to introduce a new anti-waste measure, and if a 
preexisting anti-waste measure is operating to maintain satisfactory use, 
there is no need to alter the existing measure.  However, when there is 
unsatisfactory resource use, whether over-use or under-use,62 then there can 
be legally cognizable waste, and if it is great enough the law will impose or 
change anti-waste measures.   
Under-use of resources is one example of an unsatisfactory 
perceived resource context that can amount to waste.63 Under-use can be 
attributed to under-production of a resource itself, for example insufficient 
legal access to extract the natural gas necessary to generate desired energy 
levels.64 Alternately, under-use might also describe the physical escape of a 
resource, for example accessing the desired amount of natural gas but 
failing to capture or harness a large percentage of it.65 Under-use can also 
describe too little production of positive externalities or co-benefits 
associated with a resource use, for example not realizing the desired level of 
                                                 
62 Cf. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 
1197 (1999) (“[P]eople can waste resources equally through overuse and underuse.”); 
WILLIAM ASCHER, WHY GOVERNMENTS WASTE NATURAL RESOURCES: POLICY FAILURES 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 36 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1999) (“[E]ven 
conservationists should condemn both over- and underexploitation. We can define 
underexploitation as resource development and extraction that falls short of fulfilling 
society’s potential for gains, taking into account all considerations of benefits and costs. If 
a low level of resource extraction is indeed in society’s interests, perhaps because it permits 
the intact resource stock to provide environmental services, or because extraction requires 
great economic or environmental costs, then low extraction is optimal; underextraction 
would be even lower.”). 
63 Cf. McCaffery, supra note 1 at 88 (identifying a conception of waste as “nonuse—
the failure beneficially to use one’s time, talents, or resources.”). 
64 Such under-use might result from property entitlements limiting access to natural 
gas reservoirs, possibly because of anti-commons or holdout problems.  See discussion 
infra Part III.B1. 
65 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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energy independence due to too little domestic natural gas production 
relative to imported fuel.  
The converse unsatisfactory perceived resource context is over-use, 
which can take two forms. First it can be too much use of an actual 
resource, for example burning too much natural gas and causing a perceived 
threat to supplies. Alternatively, perceived over-use can describe use of one 
resource that causes negative externalities to occur.66 Such overuse might 
include the perception of burning too much natural gas not because of a 
threat to supplies but because of its release of harmful greenhouse gasses.  
In this sense, the use of one resource might be considered wasteful because 
of its impacts on another resource.     
In sum, the perception of resource over- or under-use relative to 
resource supplies is a key factor in identifying legally cognizable waste.  
 
B. Specific Societal Values 
 
Values complement perceived resource context in informing legally 
cognizable waste. In this context, values function like priorities; they offer 
guiding principles for preferences in resource use (or non-use).  To make 
explicit a basic (or at least a linguistically tautologous) connection between 
“values” and “value,” it is values that lead people to assign value to 
resources.  Thus, if waste can be broadly defined as the misuse of a thing of 
value,67 then a thing with no value cannot be wasted, regardless of its 
scarcity. Without values as a condition precedent, it is difficult to imagine a 
concept of waste.  
In the abstract, the catalogue of potential values that might impact a 
determination of waste is as long and varied as possible conceptions of 
waste.  However, a survey of legal anti-waste provisions68 and scholarship69 
reveals that the law embraces only a relative few specific societal values to 
identify legally cognizable waste.  Specifically, the legally relevant values 
are 1) economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future 
generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecology. The following 
sub-sections discuss how these values inform legal conceptions of waste. 
 
1. Economic-Efficiency Utilitarian Concerns 
 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 796-97.  
67 Cf. id. at 796 (“Courts have identified two closely related bases for restricting the 
right to destroy. While excising theological strains from Locke's antiwaste argument, they 
have embraced his notion that society must not tolerate the waste of valuable resources.”) 
68 See discussion infra at Part III. 
69 See the remainder of this subsection 
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Welfarist utilitarianism is one of the most important underlying 
values to anti-waste laws, as well as to property law in general.70 This 
value, with its concern for economic efficiency, underscores the prevalent 
law-and-economics approach to property.71 Its objective is to maximize the 
total wealth of society through efficient allocation of resources, with 
efficiency here defined as the point where the societal welfare gains of a 
change in resource allocation are greater than the societal welfare losses.72   
Essential to this concept of welfare maximization is how one 
calculates welfare, and here welfare simply reflects value as measured by 
the willingness to pay for something.73 Thus, under this approach “value is 
simply and strictly a matter of subjective preferences.”74 The more someone 
is willing to pay, the more that person values the item and the more his 
owning it contributes to social welfare. In this context, when resources are 
prevented from their highest valued use, then they are not efficiently 
deployed and waste results.   
From this economic point of view, a free market provides the most 
potent measure against such waste. As Adam Smith’s famous “invisible 
hand” metaphor explains, self-interest will result in gains from trade and put 
resources in the hands of those that value them most.75 The oft-cited Coase 
Theorem76 reflects the same principle, asserting that in functioning markets 
with low transaction costs, resources will be allocated efficiently regardless 
of initial allocation of property entitlements.77 The basic economic premise, 
as paraphrased by Richard Posner, is that “resources tend to gravitate 
toward their most valuable uses if voluntary exchange—a market—is 
permitted.”78 
This idea of a voluntary market for valuable uses is strongly tied to 
autonomy concepts. After all, measuring the efficient use of a resource 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property 
Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157 (2012) (“The dominant form of legal discourse in 
contemporary America is welfarist. … most property scholars presume that maximizing 
social welfare is the primary goal of a property system”). 
71 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 745 (2009) (“law-and-economics theory [is] the dominant mode 
of theorizing about property in contemporary legal scholarship.”). 
72 See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 72; POSNER, supra note 38 at 13. This is also 
called the “Kaldor-Hicks” definition of efficiency.  See POSNER, supra note 38 at 13. 
73 POSNER, supra note 38 at 10. 
74 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 87. 
75 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES par. IV.2.9 
76 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 31 (noting that the article laying out the 
Coase Theorem “has become the most frequently cited work in all of legal scholarship”). 
77 See generally Coase, supra note 36. 
78 POSNER, supra note 38 at 9. 
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based on subjective preferences79 evidenced by willingness to pay 
necessarily anticipates a wide freedom in choices about resource use.  From 
an economic point of view, “[t]he value of free choice is a central tenet”80 
and “[a]ny time a consumer is pushed away from his optimal allocation of 
income, harm is imposed.”81 As a result, legal anti-waste measures that 
interfere with autonomy by steering resource uses one way or another may 
initially seem at odds with economic-efficiency values.82 Some might even 
say they create waste rather than prevent it.83 
However, even anti-waste laws that interfere with a degree of 
autonomy can comport with economic efficiency values when the anti-
waste measures seek to correct market malfunctions that either prevent 
gainful trades or create costs without offsetting benefits. Thus, from the 
standpoint of economic efficiency, the primary reason for legal anti-waste 
provisions is to prevent barriers to a voluntary market and reduce or 
eliminate costs that have no offsetting gains (i.e. deadweight losses).84 An 
economic concept of waste might simply refer to anything that costs more 
than necessary (i.e. where costs exceed benefits, assuming that all costs are 
internalized). Thus, the goal of economically oriented anti-waste measures 
is essentially to internalize all costs and eliminate those that do not yield 
benefits. Economically motivated anti-waste measures typically pursue this 
goal by reducing transaction costs to allow for gainful trades, internalizing 
external costs to allow for correct pricing, and eliminating commons 
problems that create deadweight losses. 
First, for efficient markets to function, transaction costs, such as the 
costs of gathering information or negotiating and formalizing deals, must 
not be so high as to prevent gainful trades.85 For example, a lack of 
information to market participants may prevent uninformed parties from 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 87. 
80 IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 1 (discussing the indispensability of free choice in 
understanding the concept of a demand curve). 
81 Id. at 27. 
82 Cf. id. (“regulatory solutions require armies of bureaucrats to write and enforce the 
regulations dictating what they think the highest-value uses must be (which are unlikely to 
be coincident with consumers’ definitions except perhaps for some ‘median’ citizen).  In 
this system, it almost certainly is true that many high-value users will be squeezed out of 
the market in favor of low-value users, creating a large loss in total surplus”) 
83 See id. 
84 Id. at 70 (defining deadweight loss as “a loss to one person not offset by a gain to 
others.  When one person loses utility from some market interference, such as a tax, and no 
one gains any utility, then deadweight loss is said to arise.”). Cf. ASCHER, supra note 61 at 
1 (“Many rich countries, including the United States, have wasted natural resources and 
continue to do so: pastures erode for overgrazing, soils become contaminated, and forests 
are leveled, often without offsetting benefits for society.”) (emphasis added). 
85 Cf. Coase, supra note 36. 
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entering trades that would otherwise yield efficient resource uses.86 Thus, 
government intervention may be necessary to foster markets, and thereby 
prevent waste, by disseminating information and lowering transaction costs. 
Additionally, when meaningfully lowering transaction costs is impossible, 
as in the case with assembly problems or bilateral monopolies,87 economic-
efficiency may call for adjusting property entitlements to approximate the 
result of low transaction costs, leading to more valuable resource uses and 
ideally the formation of more functional markets.88 
Second, economically oriented anti-waste measures might seek to 
correct market-pricing failures caused by lack of information or 
externalized costs. To ensure that the market functions correctly and 
resources flow to their highest value uses, it is essential that the cost of 
resource use is priced correctly.89 When there are undervalued or unpriced 
costs, the benefits of a resource use may not truly exceed the costs and the 
market will not reach the efficient outcome,90 leading to an instance of 
economic waste.91 A common reason for undervalued or unpriced costs is a 
lack of market information, which leads to improper pricing.92 Thus, 
internalizing externalities, whether through disseminating information93 or 
through market correction, is a key aspect of economic anti-waste 
measures.94 
                                                 
86 See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 248. Similarly, assembly problems in 
attempting to organize or coordinate property rights among multiple owners can also create 
high transaction costs. See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 39. 
87 See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 39. 
88 Cf. Coase, supra note 36. 
89 See ASCHER, supra note 61 at 36 (noting that costs include “not only the direct and 
obvious costs of exploiting the resource but also the lost opportunities that developing and 
extracting it would foreclose. . .  [such as] the economic benefits that alternative uses of 
capital, effort, and land itself could have produced [or] the environmental benefits of 
leaving the resources intact rather than extracting them.”). 
90 Cf. id. at 16 (“[G]overnments chronically ignore the first principle of resource 
economics for public lands, namely, that they should charge the users the full value of the 
resources they extract, lest the users overexploit ‘cheap’ resources.”) 
91 When resource use is underpriced, for example by failing to account for the cost of 
negative externalities, “then the resource exploiters can still profit from selling units that 
are not societally worthwhile, given the damage they cause.” Id. at 41 
92 See id. at 8 (“lack of information . . .will cause resource exploiters to choose the 
wrong resources, the wrong timing, or the wrong resource exploitation techniques, 
depending on the nature of their ignorance. The consequences may be either under- or 
overexploitation, depending on the biases caused by faulty information.”). 
93 Disseminating information might also be considered lowering transaction costs of 
gaining information. Cf. Coase, supra note 36. 
94 A further extension of this economic concept would also evaluate anti-waste 
measures to see if the cost of enforcing the measure creates a better result than even an 
imperfect market with some externalities. See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 239 (2005) 
(“The real world question is whether a government-imposed solution is likely to generate 
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Third, economic anti-waste measures seek to avoid common-pool 
resource problems that result in deadweight losses such as rent erosion, 
where ill-defined property rights lead to races to capture resources and the 
effort spent on these races approaches the value of the resource.95 
Economics considers resources expended on such races as pure waste.96 
Economic anti-waste measures also seek to avoid tragedy-of-the-commons 
problems, where individuals with access to a common pool resource each 
act in their own self-interest but degrade the resource as a whole.97  
Once anti-waste measures respond to these three issues by enabling 
markets and internalizing costs, then, from an economic efficiency 
standpoint, the work is largely done and the functioning markets avoid 
waste in their natural course.  
Economically oriented property and resource law scholarship 
identifies and addresses waste in similar market-facilitating and market-
correcting terms. For example, Richard Posner has explained the doctrine of 
landlord-tenant waste as responding to inefficiencies caused by transaction 
costs and bilateral monopolies inherent in ownership of divided estates.98 
Similarly, in the natural resource context, Professor William Baxter has 
articulated an economic-efficiency “no-waste criterion” as a meta-principle 
for environmental policy questions.99 Baxter’s framework seeks to 
maximize “human satisfaction” value from limited resources by engaging in 
a cost benefit analysis of resource preservation versus resource use.100 
Moreover, Baxter’s concept of waste expressly counts human willingness to 
pay as the sole criterion by which to evaluate resource use decisions, flatly 
rejecting any other measure of environmental health or value.101 Relatedly, 
                                                                                                                            
more surplus than an imperfect free market that includes some externalities”) 
95 See, e.g., id. at 136.  
96 See id. at 227 (“Whenever property rights re ill defined, resources are devoted to 
obtaining them.  These expenditures are pure waste.  Resources used to seize property 
rights to an existing asset have an opportunity cost.  They could be used to create goods 
and services.”) 
97 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-4 (1990). 
98 See Posner, supra note 8 at 1095-96. 
99 See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 
3-4 (1974) 
100 See id. 
101 See id.at 3-9 (“my criteria are oriented to people, not penguins…. I have no interest 
in preserving penguins for their own sake. . . . I reject the proposition that we ought to 
respect ‘the balance of nature’ or to ‘preserve the environment’ unless the reason for doing 
so, express or implied, is the benefit of man.”). See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People 
or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1127, 1131 (1999) (summarizing Baxter’s no-waste criterion in terms of the endangered 
species act as “ensuring the optimum use of society’s resources requires not only 
identifying the value of endangered species, but weighing that value against the value of 
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political scientist William Ascher has relied on the same economic 
conception of waste in his book Why Governments Waste Resources, 
asserting that “a given resource should be developed only if its net benefits 
are greater than the benefits arising from alternative uses, and we should 
extract each resource unit when its net benefit is greatest.”102 
 
2. Human Flourishing Concerns 
 
While economic-efficiency utilitarianism contributes much to 
property theory and informs legally cognizable waste, it is not the only 
value that the law embraces in identifying and addressing waste.103 Concern 
with human flourishing also animates legal conceptions of waste. 
These human flourishing concerns are actually not too dissimilar to 
economic-efficiency utilitarianism in their objectives,104 for both economic-
efficiency utilitarianism and human flourishing values have in common the 
idea of maximizing some measure of social welfare. The key difference 
between the two, however, is how one measures social welfare, and this 
distinction in welfare metrics can lead to vastly different conceptions of 
waste. Human flourishing measures waste according to fundamental human 
needs rather than market efficiency.   
                                                                                                                            
the other uses to which we could put the resources necessary to save endangered species.”). 
102 ASCHER, supra note 61 at 36.   
103 Cf. Vlad Tarko, Elinor Ostrom’s Life and Work, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONS: 
BEYOND MARKET FAILURE AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 50 (IEA 2012) (“Economic 
efficiency is just one possible social goal among many, and most people would disagree 
that it is a goal that trumps all others. Other social goals such as fairness, stability, social 
peace, voice and inclusivity, liberty, long-term resilience and adaptability, are often 
considered as important if not more important than economic efficiency.”); ASCHER, supra 
note 61 at 253 (“the efficiency concerns [discussed in his book] have obviously focused on 
natural-resources exploitation. Yet there is another notion of efficiency that emerges . . . . 
Given that sound resource exploitation is often sacrificed in order to pursue other 
objectives, we may also ask how well those other objectives are achieved through 
maneuvers in resource sectors. Does this success make up for the waste of natural 
resources?”); POSNER, supra note 38 at 11, 27 (“efficiency, when used . . . to denote that 
allocation of resources in which value is maximized, has limitations as an ethical criterion 
of social decisionmaking” and “there is more to justice than economics . . . ”). 
104 Cf. Jedediah Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 949, 955 (2009) (“For uber-utilitarian Jeremy Bentham and his 
followers, the moral gravamen of the program was (in significant part) that it counted the 
well-being of all alike; those reformers scorned obscurantist modes of reasoning that they 
saw as preserving the inequitable privileges of elites. Utilitarianism, then, was in good part 
a view about equality, and as a mode of justification, it relied on the idea that all who 
participated in social life were obliged to respect that idea of equality--that is, to embrace a 
set of institutions and rules designed on the principle that the welfare (or, happiness) of 
each counted alike.”). 
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As discussed above, economic-efficiency utilitarianism measures 
welfare as the aggregate of subjective preferences. This is an endogenous 
measure reflected by willingness to pay, and economic-efficiency does not 
concern itself with the underlying motivation, context, or urgency of these 
preferences.  Under this measure, waste is a failure to put a resource to its 
highest value use, and individual computations of value are left 
unexamined.   
Human flourishing values, however, take a different measure of 
welfare, and thus a different measure of waste. Rather than serving 
endogenous, subjective valuation, human flourishing concerns attempt to 
serve an exogenous, objective valuation. Such an approach might disregard 
individual subjective preferences in favor of some conception of what is in 
the best interest of society, i.e. what is fundamentally necessary for a life 
well-lived. Put another way, the economically-efficient use of a resource 
may not be its best use from a human flourishing point of view, so the value 
neutrality of economic-efficiency gives way to a prioritization of resource 
uses. Under this approach, a resource use that does not sufficiently serve 
fundamental human needs may be considered wasteful, even if it would 
fetch the highest price.105  
Gregory Alexander has articulated how this human flourishing value 
might fit in the broader context of property law, suggesting that “[s]ocial 
structures, including distributions of property rights and the definition of the 
rights that go along with the ownership of property, should be judged, at 
least in part, by the degree to which they foster the participation by human 
beings in these objectively valuable patterns of existence and 
interaction.”106 Alexander has stressed property law’s role in “cultivating 
the conditions necessary for members of our communities to live well-lived 
lives and to promote just social relations, where justice means something 
more than simply aggregate wealth-maximization.”107   
Eduardo Peñalver’s scholarship develops similar themes. For 
example, in his virtue-based theory of land use, Peñalver calls for a 
“substantive conception of the human good or flourishing,”108 which 
requires “recognition of the importance of values in addition to those of 
self-interested wealth maximization.”109 Peñalver further suggests that 
“owners' rights are qualified by an obligation to share from their surplus 
                                                 
105 See Davidson, supra note 17 at 798 (“the assumption of value neutrality has long 
been challenged and critiques about materialism and ecological harm fit comfortably 
within a normative tradition that does not concede that all preference satisfaction is 
equal.”). 
106 Alexander, supra note 70 at 764. 
107 Id. at 819 (emphasis added). 
108 Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 864-867 (2009). 
109 Id. 
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property with those who need them in order to satisfy more fundamental 
needs.”110 
Though not expressly addressing the idea of waste, Alexander’s and 
Peñalver’s approaches outline the human flourishing value that identifies 
legally cognizable waste not in terms of willingness to pay but rather in 
terms of satisfaction of objectively recognized fundamental needs for a life 
well-lived. Such needs certainly include the basics for human survival, but 
they can extend further depending on the recognized conception of what 
aspects are necessary for a fulfilling life.    
Such a concept of waste based on human flourishing and 
fundamental needs strikes a common chord with Edward McCaffery’s 
work, which identifies a concept of waste as non-urgent luxury 
expenditures. Drawing upon the philosophies of Thomas Scanlon and John 
Rawls,111 McCaffery measures waste not by the economic-efficiency 
guided subjective valuation but instead by objective measures of 
interpersonal value, described by Scanlon and, in turn, McCaffery, as 
“urgency.”112 While McCaffery leaves some play in the definition of 
urgency, he ties it to the general idea of fundamentally necessary and 
important expenditures.  Thus he offers “it is ‘waste,’ say, to spend money 
on a lesser urgent need while allowing a more pressing matter to wait, or to 
buy one more luxury car or fur coat when one has garages and closets full 
enough as is.”113 McCaffery also illustrates nonurgent waste in terms of 
natural resources, positing that “nonurgent waste of capital is a harmful 
public use: Squandering money on baubles is like failing to replenish the 
soil or polluting waterways.”114  
A concept of waste based on these human flourishing ideals 
necessitates anti-waste measures that go beyond merely facilitating and 
correcting markets. Unlike the economic-efficiency value, which relies on 
functioning markets to combat waste, in the case of fundamental needs and 
non-urgent waste, one “cannot count on the invisible hand of subjective 
self-interested action to serve the collective good” because the “subjective 
and reasonable objective interests diverge when it comes to nonurgent 
                                                 
110 Id. at 880 (emphasis added). 
111 See McCaffery, supra note 1 at 87.   
112 See, e.g., id. 
113 See, e.g., id. at 88. 
114 Id. at 92. See also Davidson, supra note 17 at 757 (“In particular, status signaling 
can skew property's incentive and allocative benefits, leading people to over-invest in 
status-enhancing property and undermining welfare gains associated with trades around 
property” and “this may over-incentivize the production of, or investment in, status-related 
resources. These kinds of incentives perennially risk misallocation, both between the 
choice to invest resources in property and the choice not to, and between status-related 
versus non-status-related resources within the realm of property.”) 
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waste.”115 Thus, anti-waste measures designed to serve human flourishing 
concerns must define objective interests and steer resource use in those 
directions, thereby curtailing autonomy in service of some identified greater 
good. 
 
3. Concern for Future Generations 
  
Closely related to the concern for human flourishing is the concern 
for future generations, which takes account of the flourishing of those to 
come.116  As Edith Brown Weiss has noted, “the notion that each generation 
holds the earth as a trustee or steward for its descendants strikes a deep 
chord with all cultures, religions, and nationalities.  Nearly all human 
traditions recognize that we, the living, are sojourners on earth and 
temporary stewards of our resources.”117 Thus, when animated by concern 
for future generations, “a social welfare measure might accord similar 
weight to the well-being of individuals ten generations into the future as it 
does to the well-being of the present generations.”118 From this perspective, 
waste means a foreclosing of options for future generations to meet their 
needs. 
While this concern for future generations is widely held, it raises the 
question of which anti-waste measures best protect the interests of 
generations to come. Some scholars have suggested that economic-
efficiency principles, such as those discussed above, sufficiently protect 
future generations from waste and thus no further anti-waste measures are 
necessary.119 For example, Harold Demsetz has offered the influential 
theory that property owners with sufficiently durable rights will optimally 
maximize the value of property over time rather than overexploit it in the 
short term.120 Richard Posner has illustrated this concept through the 
example of how economic incentives will prevent a private owner from 
prematurely depleting natural resources such as timber:121   
                                                 
115 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 88. 
116 See ASCHER, supra note 61 at 32 (“a resource practice should not lead to lower 
societal well-being for future generations”). 
117 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable 
Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 20 (1992). See also EDITH BROWN WEISS, 
IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1989). 
118 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2004). 
119 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1465, 1466 (1989). 
120 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, 57 (1967): 347-59. See also Peñalver, supra note 107 
at 848.  
121 See POSNER, supra note 38 at 87.   
24 Anti-Waste [24-Mar-14 
 
In deciding whether to cut down a tree, the private owner of the land 
on which the tree is growing will consider not only the revenue from the sale 
of the timber and the cost of cutting down and sawing the tree but also the 
opportunity cost of not waiting until the tree has grown to its full height.122   
 
Applying these concepts to the anti-waste context leads to the 
conclusion that functioning markets should sufficiently protect future 
generations from waste. The theory suggests that the market should account 
for both present and future costs and benefits and thus should attend to the 
needs of future generations through the same invisible hand that prevents 
waste in the present.  
However, this theory has drawn criticism on the basis that the 
market cannot sufficiently serve future generations due to present-value 
discounting, split incentives between divided interests, and the durability of 
present resource uses.123 As a result, concern for future generations may 
define waste more broadly than the economic-efficiency utilitarian 
conception, and efforts to protect future generations from waste may go 
beyond mere market correction.   
The first reason that markets may not sufficiently shield future 
generations from waste comes from the idea that even in functioning 
markets, present-value discounting of future costs and benefits may lead 
rational actors to waste resources from the perspective of future generations.  
Rational economic actors make decisions based on “present value of net 
benefits” which requires “adjust[ing] the valuation of benefits and costs 
occurring at different times.”124 This leads to discounting of future benefits 
because “generally, a benefit coming earlier is valued more than one 
coming later, because of both impatience and the opportunity to invest 
current savings for greater value in the future.”125 Additionally, to the extent 
that there is a lack of information on future costs and benefits, resource 
users are likely to err on the side of maximizing current benefits.126 By 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 107. 
124 ASCHER, supra note 61 at 33. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. at 44 (“lack of information . . .will cause resource exploiters to choose the 
wrong resources, the wrong timing, or the wrong resource exploitation techniques, 
depending on the nature of their ignorance. The consequences may be either under- or 
overexploitation, depending on the biases caused by faulty information. However, insofar 
as resource exploiters know that ignorance puts them at risk of making blunders in long 
term resource development and extraction plans, they tend to extract resources quickly 
wherever immediate profits appear. Therefore, there may be a greater tendency toward 
immediate overextraction and inadequate resource development. Ignorance will also 
provoke wasteful exploitation due to lack of knowledge of true input costs or output 
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logical extension, this discounting forces property owners to “completely 
disregard the consequences of their decisions beyond a certain point in the 
future.”127  As a result:  
 
[P]rivate owners are likely dramatically to underweigh--relative to 
short-term consequences--costs (or gains) arising from their land-use choices 
when those effects are projected to occur far into the future. This preference 
for near-term gains generates intertemporal externalities, which may be 
enormous and catastrophic, but which are impossible for an unassisted land 
market to internalize.128 
 
Second, split incentives and divided interests may require further 
market interventions to protect future generations from waste. A divided 
interest exists between “[t]he present generation, [which] owns the whole of 
the earth and all things on it”129 and future generations, who will come to 
own the whole of the earth.  Those alive today may not only discount future 
uses to present value, but they might also “care very little about the well-
being of individuals ten generations in the future.”130 This creates a split 
incentive where economic incentives alone will not protect future 
generations (which may be thought of as future interest holders) from 
wasteful use by the current generation (i.e. present interest holders). Posner 
illustrates this concept, once again through the example of economic 
incentives regarding the cutting of trees, only this time he presents a split 
incentive scenario arising from the divided interests between a life tenant 
(present interest holder) and remainderman (future interest holder):  
 
A life tenant will have an incentive to maximize not the value of the 
property—that is, the present value of the entire stream of future earnings 
obtainable from it—but only the present value of the earnings stream 
obtainable during his expected lifetime. He will therefore want to cut timber 
before it has attained its mature growth even though the present value of the 
timber would be greater if the cutting of some or all of it were postponed, if 
the added value would inure to the remainderman.”131  
 
Since the present generation is in the same present-interest position as 
Posner’s hypothetical life tenants, then the same risk of waste exists in 
regard to future generations, who are in the same future-interest position as 
the hypothetical remainderman. Thus, the concern for future generations 
                                                                                                                            
prices.”). 
127 Peñalver, supra note 107 at 854. 
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129 SHAVELL, supra note 117 at 71. 
130 Id. 
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counsels that legal measures beyond market correction are necessary to 
prevent rational, self-interested present-generation property owners from 
imposing waste on generations to come.132   
Finally, the enduring legacy of resource uses may also prejudice 
future generations. As Peñalver has discussed, resource decisions often 
effect durable changes that foreclose options for future generations.133 
Moreover, present resource decisions have longer-term impacts in terms of 
“deplet[ing] the capital stock” available to future generations.134  
As a result of such durability of present resource uses as well as 
present-value discounting and split incentives between divided interests, the 
concept of waste, when viewed from the perspective of future generations, 
encompasses more than economic efficiency as measured by willingness-to-
pay. Rather, the idea of waste in terms of future generations also includes 
the idea of foreclosing options. As a result, anti-waste measures concerned 
with protecting future generations may go beyond facilitating and correcting 
market forces and instead affirmatively steer resource uses to preserve 
options for generations to come. 
 
4. Stability and Consistency Concerns 
  
Apart from concerns for economic efficiency, human flourishing, or 
future generations, values favoring societal stability and consistency also 
inform legal conceptions of waste and animate anti-waste principles. These 
stability and consistency concerns include protecting settled expectations, 
preserving the status quo, ensuring quiet enjoyment of property, or keeping 
the peace. Relatedly, these same values also animate efforts to maintain 
cultural continuity, which can manifest in measures to preserve cultural 
legacies or identities, such as historic buildings in urban settings or 
agricultural land use in farming communities.   
From the vantage of stability and consistency concerns, waste takes 
the form of disruption, replacement, or alteration of the fundamental 
character of some designated resource use. This idea of waste might also be 
conceived as the cost (monetarily, emotionally, culturally, or otherwise) of 
shifting expectations and adapting to new circumstances. Examples of such 
waste might include tearing down a historic building, selling a town park 
into private ownership and thereby eliminating public access, or shifting a 
                                                 
132 Cf. id. at 73 (2007) (“law has an important role to play in regulating divided 
ownership”). 
133 Peñalver, supra note 107 at 853 (“The durability of land-use decisions' 
consequences and the finite quantity of land mean that the decisions that current owners 
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134 McCaffery, supra note 1 at 94. 
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residential neighborhood to commercial use. Such ideas of waste rely on 
subjective valuation, but this valuation differs from the economic-efficiency 
willingness-to-pay or human-flourishing fundamental-needs metrics 
discussed above. Instead, this stability and consistency concern responds a 
social value placed on preservation or continuation of certain cultural 
resource uses.    
Joseph Sax’s scholarship develops some of these stability and 
continuity concerns. For example, in his book Playing Darts with a 
Rembrandt, Sax highlights the cultural values in fine art, architecture, 
important papers, and antiquities, suggesting that “[s]ome objects, … 
regardless of who owns them, are important to a larger community.”135 
Accordingly, Sax argues, the “larger community has a legitimate stake [in 
these objects] because they embody ideas, or scientific and historic 
information, of importance.”136 Thus, Sax suggests that unqualified notions 
of ownership are inappropriate for such property, and he proposes 
protections, which essentially amount to anti-waste measures, guarding 
against destruction or denial of access to this property.137 
These same values underscore decisions to regulate resource uses 
for the purpose of protecting communities, cultural traditions, or ways of 
life, for instance by restricting the sale of water so that agricultural 
communities maintain their character and do not give way to other forms of 
development.138 In fact, Sax has addressed similar issues in the context of 
water use. For example, Sax has described water as “a community’s capital 
stock”139 as well as a “heritage resource.”140 Extending this concept, 
stability and continuity values counsel protecting such cultural interests in 
heritage resources from waste because communities are attached to water in 
the same way that cultures are attached to their antiquities and cultural 
properties.141 Explicitly linking Sax’s concepts to the idea of waste, Buzz 
Thompson has noted that “the central importance of water to communities’ 
development and sustainability has spawned universal rules against waste” 
and “[t]he United States Supreme Court also has lent some credence to the 
                                                 
135 SAX, supra note 8 at 1. 
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heritage concept by suggesting that states can prohibit the exportation of 
water in some settings where the Constitution would prohibit similar 
hoarding of other natural resources.”142 
Whether deployed toward community interests in natural resources, 
art, or architecture, these cultural stability and continuity values also 
resonate with Margaret Radin’s scholarship linking property and 
personhood. Drawing on Hegel’s philosophy of property rights,143 Radin 
suggests that certain types of property closely contribute to one’s 
personhood and self-conception and thus should be treated differently than 
otherwise fungible property.144 To extend this personhood concept from the 
individual to the community level, just as certain forms of property may be 
bound up in identity and self-conception, so may certain resources be bound 
up in the defining attributes of a community, and such resources may merit 
anti-waste protections.  
 Taken together, these approaches contribute to a conception of 
waste as the interruption, destabilization, or destruction of culture, 
community, or identity.  
 
5. Ecological Concerns  
 
Finally, ecological values introduce a concept of waste concerned 
with maintaining ecosystem integrity. While this subsection makes no 
attempt at comprehensively surveying the rich field of environmental ethics, 
it highlights a few noteworthy examples of ecological values that have 
influenced legally cognizable waste conceptions. For instance, Aldo 
Leopold’s “land ethic” is considered “probably the most influential 
statement of ethics in the American environmental movement.”145 In it 
Leopold lays a foundation for ecologically centered conceptions of waste, 
stating “[i]t is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist 
without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its 
value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere 
                                                 
142 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph 
Sax’s Water Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 368-69 (1998) (citing Sporhase v. 
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143 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968, 
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economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense."146 To 
operationalize this concept, Leopold suggests evaluating resource uses “in 
terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is 
economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise.”147  
Sax’s scholarship has incorporated similar ecological concepts. For 
example, Sax has called for “property rights designed to accommodate both 
transformational needs and the needs of nature's economy.”148 Moreover, 
Sax has advocated for “[resource] use . . . determined ecosystemically, 
rather than tract by tract;” “[i]ncreased ecological planning, because 
different kinds of lands have different roles;” and “[a]ffirmative obligations 
by owners to protect natural services.”149 
Because these ecological perspectives respond to inherent ecosystem 
values that evade monetary measures, cost-benefit analyses are inapplicable 
and inappropriate as a metric for determining waste.150 Instead, Leopold’s 
metric of preserving the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community serves as a central guiding principle of ecologically oriented 
anti-waste measures.151 
 
III. ANTI-WASTE MEASURES  
 
Part II set out a framework for identifying legally cognizable waste 
through the convergence of perceived resource context and specific societal 
values. Part III now extends that framework to explain how the law 
addresses legally cognizable waste via anti-waste provisions. In responding 
to the perceived resource contexts and specific societal values discussed 
above, anti-waste provisions have displayed both commonality and 
consistency. Despite arising in fundamentally different circumstances 
across various resources, jurisdictions, and time periods, legal anti-waste 
measures fall within one of three categories: usage vetoes, market-
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facilitating measures, and sustainability measures. Usage-veto provisions 
empower selected parties to halt perceived wasteful changes to resource 
uses; market-facilitating measures prevent economic waste by encouraging 
and correcting markets; and sustainability measures proscribe wasteful 
overconsumption of resources fundamental to human and ecosystem 
flourishing. This Part details how anti-waste laws originate and operate 
according to these consistent structures.  
 
A. Usage Vetoes 
 
Usage-veto anti-waste measures, which include some of the earliest 
anti-waste doctrines instituted in the American legal experience, respond 
primarily to stability and continuity values and arise in perceived resource 
contexts of overuse or threatened overuse. To prevent such overuse, usage-
veto measures essentially bestow on certain select individuals a private veto 
power over the resource uses of others.152 Thus, these doctrines withdraw 
from the owner some autonomy over resource uses and shift that authority 
to particular private individuals.153 The individuals selected to receive this 
veto authority normally favor established resource uses and thus exercise 
the veto authority to “arrest a future conflicting use.”154 As a result, these 
usage-veto measures consistently limit resource development in favor of 
maintaining the status quo.155 Through this “semi-preservationist”156 
system, usage-veto measures guard against waste, as conceived from the 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 6 at 687 (describing the law of landlord-tenant waste as 
a presumptive veto). 
153 By limiting owners’ agenda-setting rights, usage-veto measures resemble what 
Henry Smith has described as “governance rules,” which “require the specification of 
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156 See Sprankling, supra note 18.  
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standpoint of stability and continuity values, in the form of disrupting, 
replacing, or altering resource uses.157  
Early American property doctrines inherited directly from English 
property law typify how usage-veto measures promoted the value of 
stability in resource uses.158 These measures arose in England, which had 
developed to the extent that its environs would allow and wanted to avoid 
perceived overuse of resources such as wood and water, which were in 
relatively limited supply.159 Further, the English laws reflected a concern 
for preserving certain “natural” uses of land, such as historic agricultural 
practices.160 
Against this backdrop, the doctrine of landlord-tenant waste arose to 
regulate how a term- or life-tenant could use the estate she occupied.161 This 
English law of landlord-tenant waste initially governed the American 
colonies, and it provided that a landlord could expect that his tenant would 
return the property to him unaltered unless the landlord consented to some 
form of change.162 Thus, landlords, who were often concerned with overuse 
or changes to existing use of land, held veto rights over their tenants’ use of 
resources, and they routinely disallowed tenants from cutting trees or 
converting land from forest to farm.163 As a result, this usage-veto system 
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162 See id. 
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 Landlord tenant waste can also be seen as serving an economic-efficiency value in 
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“perpetuate[d] the land-use status quo . . . by preferring existing uses to new 
uses,”164 and thereby avoided the apparent waste that came from altering the 
property.   
Another example of usage-veto measures limiting development in 
service of stability values comes from the early American experience with 
the English water-law doctrine of natural flow. This doctrine prevented 
interference with water flowing in its natural course and held “any use of 
water that conflicted with the interests of any other proprietor on the stream 
was an unlawful invasion of his property.”165 Thus, while water could be 
used for domestic purposes or husbandry, both of which required little 
diversion of water and thus did not materially change flow, “all other 
interference with the natural flow of water, including both diversion and 
obstruction, were illegal without the consent of all who have an interest in 
it.”166 This effectively gave down-stream water users the power to veto 
upstream water-uses that involved any substantial diversion of water. 
Preventing increased diversion of water effectively prevented changes in 
both water- and land-use, again averting perceived wasteful disruption of 
settled usage patters. 
A century after the colonial period, early laws governing oil and gas 
exploration in America also imposed usage-veto measures that effectively 
curtailed development in service of preserving the status quo. For example, 
landowners had to limit drilling efforts because neighbors could sue to 
prevent a well from draining oil and gas resources from beyond the property 
line.167 With oil and gas rights tied to land ownership,168 parties relied on 
the longstanding English ad coelum doctrine for the proposition that a 
landowner also owned the oil beneath his land,169 regardless of the fact that 
oil and gas resources are fugacious rather than fixed in place.170 Fearing that 
a well would pull a neighbor’s oil or gas across the property line and give 
rise to liability, early extractors had to carefully space their wells to avoid 
                                                                                                                            
terms of managing “the temporally inefficient situation of a present owner neglecting the 
interests of some future owner.” See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 84. However, this 
will be discussed at greater length in the next section, where economic efficiency concerns 
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169 The ad coelum doctrine derived from Lord Coke’s maxim: Cujus est solum, ejus est 
usque ad coelum et ad inferos; translated: “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also 
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draining resources from under neighboring tracts.171 Thus, a neighbor 
enjoyed implicit power to veto oil and gas exploration near the property 
lines, and hydrocarbon production suffered. Though these impacts on oil 
and gas development were likely unintended, they reflect how a usage-veto 
system focuses on the value of maintaining existing land uses, here 
represented by ad coelum expectations, at the expense of new resource 
development, here oil and gas production.172  
Usage-veto measures are not all merely transitional moments in 
history or anachronistic carryovers, however. Certain contemporary 
American water-law doctrines still employ usage-veto principles to favor 
continuity of existing resource use. For example, the “no harm rule,” a 
feature of the prior appropriations regimes173 common to the western United 
States, gives downstream water users a veto power similar to that conferred 
by the natural flow doctrine. Under the no harm rule, a downstream water 
appropriator may, upon the showing of harm, prevent an upstream water 
appropriator from selling his water right or changing the nature of his water 
use.174  This is the case regardless of whether the upstream appropriator has 
a more senior right to take water from the stream or whether the water 
would be transferred to a more valuable monetary or societal use.175 Rather, 
just like the natural flow doctrine, the no harm rule protects stability and 
continuity of existing uses by giving downstream resource users a private 
veto right. This scheme, like the other usage-veto regimes, cares not about 
causing potential economic inefficiencies or social inequalities; rather it is 
aimed at preventing one specific kind of waste: the disruption of existing 
resource use.  
Outside of the natural resource context, additional modern property 
doctrines operate on related usage-veto principles. As mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
171“That in view of the well-known tendency of said wells to drain a large extent of 
territory immediately surrounding them, it is the custom and almost universal practice of 
oil operators when operating adjoining lands, to locate their wells at least two hundred feet 
from the line of lands, in order that so far as reasonably practicable, each operator's well 
shall draw its supply from his own land, and not unnecessarily disturb or detract from the 
oil mineral wealth of the adjoining lands.” Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897) 
(the first case to apply a rule of capture analysis to a simple migration of gas across 
property boundaries).   
172 Moreover, the perceived resource context centered on preventing waste in the sense 
of overusing a neighbor’s resources; the law was not aimed at addressing under-use or 
under-development of hydrocarbon resources, both because of stability values and because 
hydrocarbons had not emerged as a major energy source and thus were not widely 
perceived as under-used. 
173 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
174 See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 781. 
175 In some circumstances, however, the no harm rule can lead to economically 
efficient results. See POSNER, supra note 38 at 77. 
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historic preservation laws serve stability and continuity values by 
preventing destruction or alternation to certain designated resource uses, 
usually in the form of building structures or neighborhood identities.176 
These laws employ a usage-veto system by removing some of an owner’s 
autonomy to alter designated historic property and empowering a third 
party, usually an historic preservation council, the right to veto proposed 
changes.177  
Artists’ rights laws function in a similar manner. These laws protect 
an artist’s right to the integrity of her work by preventing destruction or 
alteration of certain pieces of art without the artist’s permission.178 Thus, 
regardless of who owns the art as property, the artist maintains authority to 
veto certain perceived wasteful or destructive uses.  
Finally, organ donation practice offers an example of usage-veto 
measures at work.179 Even when individuals opt to donate their organs, a 
usage-veto structure gives the family, or even a lone family member, 
practical veto power over the deceased’s decision to donate.180 This anti-
waste provision shows no concern for increasing the number of achievable 
transplants or preventing needless destruction of organs.181 Instead, the 
practice aims at preventing waste in the form of disrupting stability and 
continuity, in this case the stability of the historic cultural respect for the 
wishes of the deceased’s family, even at the expense of overriding the 
autonomy of the deceased.  
 
                                                 
176 See generally SAX, supra note 8 at 48-59. 
177 See id. 
178 See generally id. at 21-35; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. 106; 
Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, G.L. c. 231 s 85S; California Art Preservation Act, 
Cal. Civ. Code s 987.  
179 See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 803-805. 
180  
Although the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides that the 
decedent's decision to donate his organs is decisive, hospitals typically will 
not harvest them unless his family also consents, even where the decedent has 
signed an organ donor card. In many cases where a decedent has indicated a 
desire to donate his organs on his driver's license, family objections prevent 
the transplantation of organs. Finally, in cases where a decedent has multiple 
next of kin (e.g., a parent survived by several children), the objections of any 
one relative can prevent a transplant as a practical matter. In short, either a 
decedent or his heirs usually can block physicians from transplanting his 
organs. The impediments that American law and custom place in the path of 
the socially responsible would-be donor are substantial.” 
Id. at 805-806. 
181 See id. at 804 (describing the “needless destruction of otherwise transplantable 
organs”). 
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B. Market-Facilitating Measures 
 
A second type of anti-waste laws, market-facilitating measures, 
respond to a set of perceived resource contexts and values that contrast 
sharply with those underlying usage-veto measures. Market-facilitating 
measures are usually rooted in the perceived resource context of under-use, 
which they seek to remedy by spurring and correcting markets for resource 
development.  Moreover, unlike the stability concerns underlying usage-
veto measures, the primary value motivating market-facilitating measures is 
economic efficiency.182  
Though market-facilitating measures are still active today and need 
not necessarily follow usage-veto measures, many early market-facilitating 
measures arose as nineteenth century American property law responded to 
the development needs of the young nation183 and reacted to the semi-
preservationist usage-veto measures inherited from English law.184 These 
doctrines reflected a new perceived resource context that viewed the 
American continent as one of limitless resources185 that were drastically 
under-used. In fact, the perception of underuse was so great that “[e]arly 
Americans viewed the seemingly endless wilderness with repugnance. It 
impeded progress, retarded prosperity, and blocked national expansion.”186  
Societal values also shifted, replacing the allegiance to stability and 
continuity with the primacy of economic development.187 As Morton 
Horwitz has described:  
 
[A]s the spirit of economic development began to take hold of 
American society in the early years of the nineteenth century . . . the idea of 
property underwent a fundamental transformation – from a static agrarian 
conception entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic, 
instrumental, and more abstract view of property that emphasized the newly 
                                                 
182 Cf. POSNER, supra note 38 at 55 (“[A]lways to assign the property right to the prior 
of two conflicting land uses . . . would be inefficient, for the later use often will be more 
valuable yet transaction costs may be prohibitive.”). 
183 See Sprankling, supra note 18 at (“[o]ur common law of property is best explained 
as an instrumentalist adaptation of English doctrines to American wilderness conditions.”). 
184 See id. (“This change in resource context and valuation necessitated a change from 
the earlier English law approaches.”) 
185 See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994) (describing the perception of “a seemingly infinite supply of 
wild animals, minerals, water and other fugitive resources.”). 
186 See Sprankling, supra note 18 at 530-31. 
187 See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 22 at (“Then along came industrialism and its siren 
call to allow landowners to use their lands more forcefully, creating noises and vibrations, 
blocking waterways, and otherwise causing disruptions. The right to use land intensively 
went up while the opposing right to quiet enjoyment declined”). 
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paramount virtues of productive use and development.188  
 
Thus the prevailing societal value of the time became one of economic 
efficiency rooted in “exploitative utilitarianism: land in its natural condition 
was considered essentially worthless until converted to human use.”189  
As a result, the conception of waste necessarily changed. Gone was 
the idea of waste as the disruption of continuity in resource uses or 
alteration of the status quo. Reflecting quite the opposite conception “the 
image of a continent tied up in primeval forest [became] a bogeyman; no 
one [would] have argued seriously that the clearing of frontier land should 
be regarded as waste.”190 Instead, waste came to mean failure to reach 
developmental potential, and anti-waste measures shifted accordingly from 
usage-veto to market-facilitating. 
For example, “in the nineteenth century . . . American judges 
beg[a]n to argue that the English law of [landlord-tenant] waste [was] 
inapplicable to a new, unsettled country, because of its restraint on 
improvement of land.”191 Courts thus narrowed the doctrine of landlord-
tenant waste as applied to wild lands and “jettisoned the waste doctrine's 
ban on clearing forest land for cultivation.”192 Instead, the new American 
version of landlord-tenant waste permitted tenants to alter land as consistent 
with “good husbandry,” which essentially encouraged immediate economic 
development of the land.193 Thus, the legal concept shifted from considering 
it wasteful to develop land against the wishes of a landlord to considering it 
wasteful to allow a landlord to stand in the way of development.194 
Moreover, by changing the waste standard from anti-development to pro-
                                                 
188 HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 31. 
189 Sprankling, supra note 18 at. See also HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 33, 37 (noting 
that judicial opinions began to reflect “the idea that the ownership of property implies 
above all the right develop that property for business purposes”); Purdy, supra note 6 at 
692. (“[p]rogress and improvement were the courts' aims, and westward movement across 
the continent was synonymous with betterment.”). 
190 Purdy, supra note 6 at 676. 
191 HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 3 (internal quotations omitted). 
192 Sprankling, supra note 18. 
193 See HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 54, 58. 
194 Not all landlord-tenant waste doctrines have evolved in such a way.  In the case of 
waste to structures, a number of courts still hold that any change constitutes waste. See 
Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 
(App. Div. 1930), aff'd mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931). Other course have 
allowed changes that enhance value. See, e.g., Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 7-
8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899). See generally Merrill, supra note 5. 
 To the extent that the American doctrine of waste has allowed for good 
husbandry, it goes further toward meeting efficiency goals like those articulated by Richard 
Posner in suggesting that an efficient solution would be to allow a tenant to do what a 
rational owner would have incentive to do. See  
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development, these economically oriented anti-waste provisions reduced 
transaction costs for tenants seeking to make more valuable uses of 
property.195 
 During the same time period, the emergence of the adverse 
possession doctrine to encourage economic utilization of wild land also 
reflected a market-facilitating anti-waste measure.196 While the doctrine 
may have originated to protect title,197 “beginning in the nineteenth century, 
American courts serving the ideology of economic expansion reformulated 
adverse possession in the pursuit of national productivity.”198 To spur 
development, adverse possession became a “tool designed to transfer title to 
wild lands from the idle true owner to the industrious adverse possessor.”199 
Similar to the landlord-tenant waste doctrines discussed in the previous 
paragraph, this approach to adverse possession again reduced transaction 
costs that would impede the development of wild land. Further, by reducing 
the threshold for adverse possession “to the point where sporadic, 
inconspicuous activities sufficed to create title,”200 courts ensured that “title 
to wild lands [could] be maintained only through progressive 
exploitation.”201 Thus, adverse possession encouraged economic progress 
by embracing a concept of “exploitative utilitarianism” that “equat[ed] 
preservation with waste.”202 In this way, it exemplified a market-facilitating 
measure in seeking to combat under-use by spurring development of 
financially valuable resource uses that would bring goods to market.  
 Nineteenth-century laws encouraging development of water mills 
offer another example of market-facilitating measures at work.203 Relying 
on dams to harness waterpower, water mills were an important energy 
source in early America.204 However, since the dams created reservoirs that 
could flood adjacent properties, liability concerns stood in the way of mill 
construction. Thus, to promote development of water mills, states passed 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6. 
196 See Sprankling, supra note 184 (“Indeed, the limitations model is occasionally 
defended on the ground that such repose encourages the utilization of land.”). See also 
POSNER, supra note 38 at 71-74 (discussing different methods for creating an efficient 
management strategy for divided-ownership estates). 
197 See Sprankling, Adverse Possession (“Land utilization is a muted, subordinate 
theme in a doctrine dominated by concern for title protection.”) 
198 Sprankling, supra note 184. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 47 (noting that “mill acts” represent “some of the 
earliest illustrations of American willingness to sacrifice the sanctity of private property in 
the interest of promoting economic development.”). 
204 See id. at 49-50. 
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“mill acts” that limited flooding liability205 and thereby lowered the 
transaction costs involved in creating mills. Justified on the basis of “an 
increase in total utility,”206 these mill acts displayed economic-efficiency 
values and drove development to remedy the perceived under-use of water 
power. 
Even earlier in American history, concern with the same concept of 
waste led to a market-facilitating approach in land-dealings with Native 
Americans. For example, the Supreme Court’s canonical 1823 decision in 
Johnson v. M'Intosh “defended the European conquest of America with the 
explanation that to ‘leave (Native Americans) in possession of their country, 
was to leave the country a wilderness,’ a consequence seemingly so 
abhorrent as to end debate.”207 Thus, the Court essentially justified 
European control of North America on the economic grounds that this result 
would better allow resources to flow to their most valuable uses (i.e. it 
would reduce transaction costs for development), and this line of reasoning 
again reflects the perception of waste as un-seized development 
opportunity.  
These market-facilitating doctrines are not limited to early American 
law, though; modern resource doctrines continue to drive market 
development. For the most part, the adverse possession principles adopted 
in the nineteenth-century still apply to wild land today,208 and a similarly 
motivated doctrine applies to leases for oil and gas extraction on federal 
public lands.209 To spur the development of marketable resources, the law 
will terminate leases unless leaseholders undertake exploration activities 
within a certain timeframe.210 Moreover, until recently the Swampbusters 
program actively encouraged filling wetlands to transform them into more 
market-valuable agricultural land.211 Similarly, some state and local 
property tax assessments rely on fair market value as determined by the 
highest and best use of land rather than its actual use,212 creating an added 
incentive for development.  
 
                                                 
205 See generally id. at 47-49. 
206 Id. at 49. 
207 Sprankling, supra note 18. 
208 See id. 
209 See 4 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW § 39:28 (2d ed. 2007) (“Private oil and gas leases are structured to force 
the lessee to drill or forfeit the lease, a diligence requirement mostly, but not entirely, 
duplicated in the federal context”). 
210 See id. 
211 See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 270 (3d Ed.) 
212 See, e.g., Florida Statute 193.011. 
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Self Correction of Market-Facilitating Measures 
 
Since an economic-efficiency conception of waste is the primary 
value underscoring market-facilitating anti-waste provisions, such 
provisions must adapt to address newly discovered market malfunctions, 
such as emerging information about unpriced externalities, transaction 
costs, or other barriers to efficient resource transactions. Additionally, as 
newer resource uses or development methods arise, older market-facilitating 
measures may become outmoded if they continue to encourage earlier uses 
that have become less efficient and ultimately economically wasteful 
themselves.213 Thus, to remain true to their underlying economic-efficiency 
values, market-facilitating anti-waste measures must remain dynamic in 
continuing to pursue the highest value resource uses.214 
The continued adjustment of the landlord-tenant waste doctrine 
demonstrates how market-facilitating measures can adapt. While the shift 
from the usage-veto English doctrine to the market-facilitating American 
doctrine first freed tenants to pursue higher value resource uses through 
“good husbandry,”215 American courts have refined the doctrine further in 
pursuit of market efficiency. For example, the American landlord-tenant 
waste doctrine formerly “held that any permanent destruction of a structure 
constituted waste, even if it improved the value of the parcel as a whole.”216 
However, now many states consider economic value the sole criterion to 
consider in determining landlord-tenant waste,217 and accordingly “an act 
that increases the value of property cannot constitute [landlord-tenant] 
waste.”218  
The evolution of water law regimes also illustrates how market-
facilitating measures can adapt to serve market-efficiency goals. Initially, 
when nineteenth-century American courts needed to “resolve the tension 
between the need for economic development and the fundamentally 
antidevelopment premise of the common law,”219 they abandoned the 
                                                 
213 See HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 34. Cf. POSNER, supra note 38 at 55 (“[A]lways to 
assign the property right to the prior of two conflicting land uses . . . would be inefficient, 
for the later use often will be more valuable yet transaction costs may be prohibitive.”). 
214 Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 34 (describing the “effort to adapt private law 
doctrines to the movement for economic growth.”). 
215 See id. at 54, 58. 
216 Strahilevitz, supra note 69 at 2157. 
217 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 5 (“In practice [in landlord-tenant waste cases], 
economic value tends to dominate everything else. If the economic value goes up, this 
confirms what a normal owner would do and where the neighborhood is heading. If the 
value goes down, the opposite inferences are drawn.”). 
218 Strahilevitz, supra note 69. 
219 HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 36. 
40 Anti-Waste [24-Mar-14 
usage-veto natural-flow regime, which effectively prohibited substantial 
water withdrawals. Courts instead adopted the market-facilitating doctrine 
of reasonable-use, which allowed riparian property owners to withdraw 
water for reasonable use on a riparian tract.220 By removing downstream 
owners’ power to veto new water uses and allowing riparian owners to 
choose water uses based on market demand, the reasonable-use doctrine 
prevented waste by eliminating some of the economically inefficient limits 
on water diversion.221  
However, because the reasonable-use doctrine tied water-diversion 
rights to riparian property, it proved ill suited for efficient development of 
the arid western United States.222 Thus, western states embraced the prior 
appropriation doctrine, which ties water rights to water use rather than to 
riparian land. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, one gains a water right 
by diverting water and putting it to beneficial use. As a result, the doctrine 
not only incentivizes development of water uses but also facilitates 
economic efficiency because water can be used where it is most valued, 
regardless of whether that is on a riparian tract or not. Moreover, the prior 
appropriation doctrine makes explicit its underlying utilitarian value 
structure by labeling unused water as “wasted.”223 
The development of oil and gas law also demonstrates an evolution 
of market-facilitating measures.  As discussed above, potential liability 
under the ad coelum doctrine initially limited exploitation of oil and gas 
resources. In response, states universally moved to encourage oil and gas 
extraction by adopting the rule of capture, which limited ad coelum 
                                                 
220 See, e.g., Mark S. Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze: 
Protecting State Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 175, 184-85 (2012) 
(“Eastern riparian regimes . . . focus on maintaining water in watercourses and sharing in 
times of shortage. Riparian water rights stem not from diversion, but rather from ownership 
of a tract of land that abuts or contains a watercourse (i.e., a riparian tract). A riparian 
landowner traditionally has the right to make reasonable use of water on the riparian tract 
or within a prescribed distance from the watercourse so that return flows will ensure 
sufficient water for downstream users. In times of drought, all riparians share the burden of 
shortage; earlier users receive no favored status.”). 
221 See HORWITZ, supra note 153 37; Joseph Sax, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium 
on Managing Hawai’i’s Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 21, 25-28 (2001).  
222 See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 231-35 (1992). The reasonable use doctrine restricted the 
use of water to riparian tracts, and thus prevented the formation of markets for water use on 
other tracts. Cf. id. 
223 See, e.g.,62 Cal. Jur. 3d Water §§28-39 intro. (2005) (“The policy of the state courts 
may be summarized to be that the rivers and streams of the state that waste into the sea 
should, if possible, be conserved for beneficial uses, and that this should be done with full 
recognition of the rights the riparian owners may properly assert.”) (emphasis added); 
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 747. 
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liability.224 Under the rule of capture, “the owner of a tract of land acquires 
title to the oil and gas that is produced from wells drilled on the tract even if 
it can be shown that the oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.”225 Thus, 
the rule of capture responded to perceived under-use of oil and gas 
resources by lowering the transaction costs of drilling. 
This shift to the market-facilitating rule of capture certainly removed 
impediments to drilling, but it proved an incomplete measure by creating 
other economic inefficiencies. Under the rule of capture, the only option to 
protect one’s oil and gas from being drained by a neighbor was to drill 
one’s own well and intercept the oil and gas.226 This incentive structure 
essentially created a race to drill as many wells as close to property lines as 
possible, both to protect one’s own reserves and to get any available share 
of a neighbor’s. However, this caused two major problems: overdrilling—
too many wells drilled creating a higher capital cost than necessary to drain 
the oil and gas reserve— and premature dissipation of the natural reservoir 
energy—that is, dissipation of the pressure that would naturally push the oil 
and gas up the wellhead.227 This incentive to drill also flooded the market, 
causing a distortion by increasing supply and thereby depressing prices. In 
economic terms, these problems created deadweight losses and rent 
erosion,228 resulting in higher costs of production and inability to extract all 
the available oil and gas from the reservoir.229  
In response to these new inefficiencies, the economically oriented 
market-facilitating measures adjusted. States adopted conservation 
regulations that imposed well-spacing requirements, limiting the number of 
wells over a reservoir and thereby preventing overdrilling and premature 
dissipation of reservoir energy. Additionally, states imposed “production 
allowables” to limit oil and gas production and prevent the “economic 
waste” that had resulted from the low prices of flooded markets.230 These 
regulations still promoted oil and gas development, but by reducing 
                                                 
224 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 166 at 3.02. 
225 Id.  
226 See 1-2 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition Scope; 1-2 The Law of 
Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 2.01 
227 This is an example of rent erosion in which a lack of defined property rights led to 
wasteful expenditures seeking to capture the value of oil and gas. Cf. IPPOLITO, supra note 
34 at 136. 
228 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
229 1-2 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 2.02. 
230 Cf. ASCHER, supra note 61 at 8 (“For resource extraction, the value of the resource 
can be squandered by extracting and selling it at the wrong time (e.g. when the prices are 
too low) or by extracting it with excessive losses (e.g. pumping oil out too rapidly leaves 
more in the ground; reckless timber harvesting can cause great damage to other trees). 
These are essentially conservation issues, assessed in terms of both getting the greatest 
economic value out of the resource endowment . . . .”).   
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deadweight losses, they remained true to the anti-waste value of economic 
efficiency.231  
Oil and gas doctrines continued to evolve in pursuit of economic-
efficiency, as states imposed additional regulations to reduce transaction 
costs associated with divided ownership of oil and gas reservoirs. Since 
reservoir shapes do not necessarily track surface-property boundaries, often 
a reservoir underlies multiple tracts.232 In such cases, the most efficient way 
to extract the oil and gas may involve well placement that does not 
correspond with property lines but rather requires landowners to cooperate 
in a single well or series of wells.233 However, because transaction costs, 
such as assembly problems or bilateral monopolies,234 frequently prevented 
economically-efficient cooperation in drilling efforts,235 states enacted 
compulsory pooling and compulsory unitization schemes that could force 
separate landowners to cooperate.236  These anti-waste schemes, which are 
still in operation today, compromise owner autonomy to promote 
economically efficient development of oil and gas resources.237  
 
C. Sustainability Measures 
 
Finally, sustainability measures constitute a third type of anti-waste 
laws, and they typically stem from a perceived resource context of concern 
about over-use. Rather than serving a single primary societal value, 
however, sustainability measures respond to a pluralist238 set of values 
including human flourishing, future generations, and ecology.  
Informed by these values, sustainability measures fundamentally 
differ from market-facilitating measures by identifying waste not according 
to economic-efficiency metrics but rather in terms of retaining options for 
immediate and future human and ecological needs. Moreover, sustainability 
measures differ from usage-veto measures because rather than seeking to 
                                                 
231 Id. 
232 See generally 1-3 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 3.02 
233 See generally 1-3 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 3.02 
234 See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 39. 
235 See Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property, 40 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (describing how tract owners do not cooperate in pooling even when it is in their 
economic best interests). 
236 Pooling and unitization could also be voluntary. See id. 
237 See Pappas, supra note 233 (discussing how these compulsory pooling and 
unitization schemes compromise otherwise protected property rights in the name of driving 
development of energy resources.). 
238 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 143 (“Pluralism in property theory eschews singular 
narratives in understanding property law, focusing instead on the varied and often 
competing normative and instrumental concerns embodied in the institution.”). See also 
Hanoch Dagan, supra note 52; Purdy, supra note 6 at 655.  
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preserve stability or continuity in resource uses, sustainability measures 
may call for changes in settled resource uses to encourage immediate and 
extended productivity. So, while sustainability measures and usage-veto 
measures might both seek to avoid over-use, they differ in their underlying 
conception of waste, and though both authority-default and sustainability 
measures may sometimes lead to a form of resource preservation, their 
different underlying values will frequently call for differing approaches to 
resource management.  
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) offers a prime example of a 
sustainability measure aimed to protect against the waste of species and 
biodiversity. Concerned with species extinction, a rather extreme form of 
over-use, the ESA protects listed species by requiring that federal actions 
not jeopardize continued species existence and by prohibiting all persons 
from harassing, harming, killing, or otherwise “taking” these species.239 
Though these protections can be quite costly, in determining which species 
are covered the ESA requires examination solely of biological risks to the 
species, explicitly disallowing economic cost-benefit analysis.240 Thus, the 
ESA intentionally eschews economic-efficiency valuation based on 
willingness to pay.241 Instead it protects species based on ecological 
concerns for biodiversity and ecosystem health as well as urgent human-
flourishing and future-generations concerns, such as the possibility of 
biodiversity providing a source for future medicines or helping contribute to 
food security.242   
Other environmental statutes incorporate similar sustainability 
measures that respond to ecosystem, human flourishing, and future 
generations values rather than willingness to pay. For example, the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) 404(b) permit system limits wetland development in 
order to achieve “no net loss” of wetlands function.243 Thus it considers 
wetlands loss a form of waste, even when markets may value other uses, 
such as development, over wetlands conservation.244 Driven by concerns 
other than economic efficiency, the CWA preserves wetlands to provide for 
current and future human flourishing needs, such as filtering contaminants 
from water and reducing flood risks,245 as well as ecological integrity.246  
                                                 
239 See 16 U.S.C 1536, 1538. 
240 See 16 U.S.C. 1533. Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 187. 
241 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 275-81 (1991). 
242 Cf. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 330-332. 
243 See 33 U.S.C. 1344; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 210 at 270.  
244 In fact, as discussed earlier, the development-driving Swampbusters program 
subsidized the filling of wetlands to encourage higher-value land uses. See id. 
245 See, e.g., id. at 269-70. These wetlands functions of filtering contaminants and 
reducing flood risks can also be described as “ecosystem services.” See, e.g., James 
Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. 
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In the same vein, the Magnuson-Stevens Act (“MSA”) manages 
federal fisheries to provide “optimum yield” that will allow for continued 
production of fisheries resources without depletion of wild fish stocks.247  
The MSA also calls for fishing practices to avoid “bycatch,” the catch and 
destruction of non-target species.248 Both of these principles seek to avoid 
wasting fisheries resources out of concern for both food availability, an 
urgent need for current and future generations, and ecosystem function.   
In the context of water law, the relatively recent development of in-
stream flow provisions reflects another sustainability anti-waste measure.  
Recognizing that excessive water diversions threatened the ecological 
integrity of many watercourses, some states have enacted in-stream flow 
laws requiring that a certain minimum amount of water remain in its natural 
watercourse. Moreover, certain states even complement these minimum-in-
stream flow provisions with laws allowing non-profit entities to hold 
additional instream-flow rights for conservation purposes. These provisions 
aim to prevent waste in the form of ecosystem destruction and its attendant 
impacts on present and future generations. In doing so, these sustainability 
measures respond to a concept of waste fundamentally different than that 
underlying the market-facilitating prior-appropriations doctrine, which had 
formerly condemned water flowing undiverted in a stream as waste.249  
Not all sustainability measures are of such recent vintage, however. 
Decades before the enactment of most environmental statutes in the 1970s, 
wildlife management laws employed sustainability anti-waste principles.250  
For example, both state and federal wild game laws sought to ensure stable 
populations of game by setting hunting limits251 and restricting markets for 
                                                                                                                            
ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310-312 (2001). Since these ecosystem services are essentially unpriced-
benefits of natural environments, scholarship has explored methods for building markets 
for ecosystem services. See, e.g., id. This approach obviously employs an economic-
efficiency value, and legal measures fostering ecosystem service markets could be seen as 
market-facilitating anti-waste measures. However, the CWA currently does not take such 
an approach, instead using a command-and-control restriction on wetlands development 
that, as discussed above, reflects a sustainability measure. 
246 See id. at 270. 
247 See 16 U.S.C. 1851. 
248 See 16 U.S.C. 1851. 
249 See, e.g.,62 Cal. Jur. 3d Water §§28-39 intro. (2005) (“The policy of the state courts 
may be summarized to be that the rivers and streams of the state that waste into the sea 
should, if possible, be conserved for beneficial uses, and that this should be done with full 
recognition of the rights the riparian owners may properly assert.”) (emphasis added); 
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 747. 
250 See, e.g., The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703. 
251 See, e.g., id.; http://mdc.mo.gov/hunting-trapping/deer-hunting/missouri-deer-
hunting-history 
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the sale of game.252 Additionally, federal and state laws expressly prohibit 
“wanton waste” of game,253 effectively codifying Locke’s disapproval of 
killing an animal and leaving it to rot in the woods.  
Earlier still, sustainability measures displaced markets to ensure that 
important resources would be available for urgent needs. For example, “in 
1817 the [federal] government had reserved for naval construction public 
lands containing live oak and red cedar and in 1832 had reserved Hot 
Springs, Arkansas because of its perceived medicinal value.”254 Similarly, 
resource concerns during World War II led to rationing regulations, which 
sought to preserve resources for the war efforts and provide an equitable 
distribution of consumer goods by curbing perceived wasteful non-urgent 
consumption.255 
 
IV. APPLYING THE WASTE FRAMEWORK 
 
The previous Parts synthesized property and resource doctrines into 
a framework for understanding legally cognizable waste concepts and anti-
waste laws. As detailed above, legally cognizable waste arises through the 
combination of perceived resource context and specific societal values, and 
anti-waste provisions respond to legally cognizable waste through usage-
veto, market-facilitating, or sustainability measures. These consistent 
responses show that anti-waste provisions are more than ad hoc, sui generis 
resource laws; rather, across different time periods, resources, and 
circumstances, legal conceptions of waste and anti-waste measures follow a 
coherent framework. 
This Part explores the practical and theoretical implications of the 
                                                 
252 See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 344-45. 
253 See, e.g., 50 CFR 20.25. Though not all states use the term “wanton waste,” most 
prohibit some variation of the concept. 
254 See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 130. 
 These early sustainability measures are no longer in place, which helps 
demonstrate that anti-waste measures do not necessarily follow a linear progression from 
one to another. That is to say, not every usage-veto measure will eventually lead to a 
sustainability measure, and sustainability measures are not necessarily the end-point of 
some anti-waste arc. Rather, anti-waste measures shift in response to changing perceived 
resource contexts and specific societal values. If a resource is not perceived to be over- or 
under-used, then there is no longer a need for an anti-waste provision and it will be 
abandoned, as were the provisions protecting the live oak and red ceder for naval 
construction.  
255 See ROBERT JAMES MADDOX, THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD WAR II, 193-194 
(1992); Robert Higgs, The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During WWII, THE 
FREEMAN, MAY, 2009; HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, OFF. OF TEMPORARY CONTROLS, OFF. OF 
PRICE ADMIN., A SHORT HISTORY OF OPA 156 (1947); ARCHIE SATTERFIELD, THE HOME 
FRONT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE WAR YEARS IN AMERICA: 1941-45 208-209 (1981). 
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waste framework. First, at a practical level, the framework offers a tool for 
understanding and analyzing individual anti-waste measures. By identifying 
the contexts and values that anti-waste provisions serve, the framework 
establishes criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of any particular anti-waste 
law. Second, on a more abstract level, the framework provides an 
overarching appreciation of how waste concepts fit into broader property 
principles and how anti-waste provisions work cumulatively to inject 
adaptability into property law. 
 
A. Analyzing Anti-Waste Provisions 
 
Anti-waste provisions are only effective if they address current 
instances of legally cognizable waste. Thus, anti-waste laws must respond 
to changes in perceived resource contexts and societal values.256 If anti-
waste measures fall out of step with contexts or values, they may become 
ineffectual or, worse yet, may cause legally cognizable waste rather than 
prevent it.257 As a result, it is essential to periodically reassess waste 
conceptions and anti-waste provisions.258 The waste framework offers a tool 
for doing so, first by considering whether perceived resource context and 
specific societal values have changed and second by considering whether 
anti-waste measures have responded to these changes. The following 
subsections offer examples of such analyses in light of current 
circumstances. 
 
1. Analyzing changes to percieved resource contexts and societal 
values 
 
Relatively recently, perceived resource contexts and societal values 
may have shifted sufficiently to call into question the continued 
applicability of many anti-waste measures. 
In terms of perceived resource context, there is a growing perception 
of limitation and over-use of many historically exploited resources, while at 
the same time, alternative resources are perceived as under-used. For 
instance, there has been an increased recognition of the limits of the finite 
                                                 
256 Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 22 (“the calculus of liberty could well change over time 
as populations rise, resources decline, and public values evolve.”). 
257 This was the case with the rule of capture leading to inefficient oil and gas 
development See discussion supra. 
258 Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 22 (“How private property's effects are evaluated overall-
-what is considered a cost, what a benefit, and how they all sum up--depends on the 
surrounding society, with its circumstances, values, and hopes.  Change the society, change 
the circumstances and values, and a property system that once made sense might no longer 
do so.”). 
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resources of our world. In terms of traditionally exploited water, land, fossil 
fuel, and wildlife resources, “[t]he nineteenth century vision of endless 
abundance faded long ago.”259 On top of that, climate change will likely 
impose further strains on these resources, as dry areas are expected to get 
drier,260 sea level rise will present additional challenges in conserving 
coastal wetlands,261 and temperature changes will threaten the survival of 
more species.262 Moreover, appreciation has grown for how these historic 
resources impact each other, such as the link between oil and gas 
exploitation and habitat destruction263 or the challenges of balancing water 
use and energy production.264 These examples are among the evidence of an 
increasing perception that traditionally exploited resources are being over-
used. 
While these traditionally harnessed resources are increasingly 
perceived as over-used, there is also increased awareness of resources and 
opportunities that are under-used. Renewable energy is a prime example, 
and while development of renewable resources certainly impacts other 
resource use,265 the widely held and increasing perception is that renewable 
energy is under-developed.266 Similarly, energy efficiency, for example the 
concept of the nega-watt,267 and water re-use or increased water 
efficiency268 are resource deployments with perceived room to grow. 
In conjunction with this change in perceived resource context, there 
is also evidence of a shift in values, including greater appreciation for 
human flourishing, future generations, and ecological concerns. For 
example, the rising recognition of ecosystem services269 embraces not only 
                                                 
259 Sprankling, supra note 184 at 857-58. 
260 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of 
State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 785-86 (2010) (discussing 
climate change impacts on water resources). 
261 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea Level Rise, Property Rights, 
and Time, 73 LA. L. REV 69, 70-71 (2012). 
262 See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 325. 
263 See, e.g., New Study Estimates Impacts of Oil and Gas Development on Sage-
grouse 
https://www.wildlifemanagementinstitute.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=402:new-study-estimates-impacts-on-sage-
grouse&catid=34:ONB+Articles&Itemid=54 
264 See, e.g., Water Energy Nexus: A Literature Review 
http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Water-Energy_Lit_Review.pdf 
265 Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 241, 253 
(2011). 
266 See, e.g., Pappas, supra note 233 
267 See, e.g., The Elusive Negawatt http://www.economist.com/node/11326549 
268 See, e.g., Water Reuse Frequently Asked Questions 
https://www.watereuse.org/information-resources/about-water-reuse/faqs-0 
269 See, e.g., James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, 
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ecological values but also the urgent human needs served by healthy 
ecosystems that, for example, provide flood control, productive soil, and 
beneficial pollinating insects.270 Moreover, growing awareness of 
environmental justice shows a focus on both ecological and human 
flourishing values.271 John Sprankling has described a similar shift in terms 
of attitudes toward wilderness:  
 
 Two centuries of development have radically transformed our 
 national attitude toward wilderness. For the pioneer, an ancient forest on 
 future farmland had a negative value; it was an obstacle to be conquered 
 before cultivation could begin. Wilderness preservation in such circumstances 
 would have been economic and social heresy. Today, in contrast, our society 
 values wilderness for both moral and utilitarian reasons.272   
 
Though focused on wilderness, Sprankling’s observation is generalizable in 
terms of how societal values regarding resources have become more 
pluralist and diversified.273  
 
2. Analyzing particular anti-waste measures 
 
If resource levels have changed, societal values have changed, and 
the climate is changing, then anti-waste measures too are due for a change. 
This section examines a selection of anti-waste measures for responsiveness 
to possible changes in perceived resource contexts and societal values. The 
few examples considered below are far from exhaustive, but they provide 
generalizable models of analysis for re-evaluating other anti-waste laws. 
First, market-facilitating measures can become outdated when they 
continue to govern resources that are no longer perceived to be under-used 
or for which the primary societal value is not limited to economic-efficiency 
concerns. For example, the market-facilitating adverse possession doctrine 
is no longer appropriate for wild lands because “[t]he need to encourage 
wilderness development . . . no longer exists in the United States.”274 
Nonetheless, “[t]oday, despite a fundamentally different national landscape, 
                                                                                                                            
Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310-312 (2001). 
270 See id. 
271 See, e.g., Environmental Justice http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/index.html 
272 Sprankling, supra note 18 at 584-85. 
273 See id. at 584-85. 
274 See id. See also Katz, supra note 254 (“Others point out that it is no longer self-
evident that adverse possession leads to more efficient uses of land because our society no 
longer straightforwardly prefers development and active uses of land over conservation and 
passive uses. Not being able to locate the benefits of adverse possession for deliberate 
squatters in utilitarian terms, American courts and commentators have become increasingly 
responsive to what they see as the moral paradox of adverse possession.”). 
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the property-law system still actively facilitates the despoliation of our 
scattered wilderness remnants.”275 Thus, because wild lands are no longer 
perceived to be under-used, a market-facilitating approach is no longer 
necessary. Additionally, societal values in wild lands appear to include 
more concerns than just economic efficiency.276 Accordingly, the answer is 
to eschew the market-facilitating approach to wild lands and shift instead to 
a provision more consistent with current perceived resource contexts and 
values. Thus, if wild lands are in fact thought to be over-used, then a 
sustainability measure or a usage-veto measure277 would be appropriate, 
depending on the prevailing societal value. If instead the current perception 
of wild lands is neither over- nor under-use but rather satisfactory use, then 
no anti-waste measure would be necessary. 
Market-facilitating measures may also become outdated when they 
fail to adjust themselves to address economic inefficiencies, such as 
unpriced externalities, in resource uses.278 In such instances, market-
facilitating approaches may still accurately reflect perceived resource under-
use and prevailing economic efficiency values, but the particular measures 
may need adjustment to address market failures. The current practice in oil 
and gas extraction shows how the market-facilitating measures promoting 
oil and gas development279 have failed to account for economic waste 
during resource extraction and thus need updating to ensure efficiency.  
To take one example, hydraulic fracturing in North Dakota’s 
Bakken Shale has produced an enormous amount of oil280 and natural 
gas.281 However, rather than capturing the natural gas, which requires 
paying for pipelines and processing plants, extractors opt for the cheaper 
solution of simply burning the gas through “flaring.”282 This gets rid of the 
natural gas and allows extractors to more cheaply capture the oil, which is 
more valuable.283 Flaring is essentially unregulated, and while it is less 
                                                 
275 Sprankling, supra note 18 
276 See, e.g., id. (“This ‘development model’ is fundamentally antagonistic to the 
twentieth century concern for preservation,”). 
277 Sprankling has offered something akin to a usage-veto measure for remedying this 
problem. He suggests that the law should respect private sanctuaries like conservation 
easements by “exemption of privately-owned wild lands from adverse possession.” 
Sprankling, supra note 184. 
278 See discussion supra. 
279 See discussion supra. 
280 Bakken Shale (July 21, 2013), http://bakkenshale.com/ 
281 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, In North Dakota, Flames of Wasted Natural Gas Light 
the Prairie, NYTimes.com, September 26, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/business/energy-environment/in-north-dakota-
wasted-natural-gas-flickers-against-the-sky.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
282  See id. 
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destructive than simply allowing the natural gas to escape into the 
atmosphere, the process still emits 2 million tons of CO2 into the 
atmosphere each year, or enough energy to heat 500,000 homes.284 Outside 
of North Dakota less than 1% of natural gas is flared off, but within the 
state, 34% was flared in 2012, resulting in North Dakota’s greenhouse gas 
emissions for flaring alone equaling those of 2.5 million cars.285 Moreover, 
in addition to the flaring on the Bakken Shale, natural gas wells throughout 
the country simply leak large quantities of methane, a potent greenhouse 
gas, into the environment.286 
This flaring and leaking of natural gas creates a form of waste that 
anti-waste measures must adapt to address. Assuming that market-
facilitating measures are still appropriate for oil and gas resources (i.e. 
assuming that oil and gas is still perceived as under-developed and societal 
values regarding oil and gas still primarily reflect economic-efficiency 
concerns), then the relevant waste to address is the unpriced externality 
caused by flaring and leakage.287 Currently oil and gas extractors do not pay 
for the environmental costs that these practices cause, and as a result the 
costs of producing oil and gas are artificially depressed.288 As a result, the 
oil and gas anti-waste measures do not serve their underlying economic-
efficiency values because they have not corrected this pricing failure in oil 
                                                 
284 See id.  
285 See Stephen Mufson, In North Dakota, the gritty side of an oil boom, July 18, 2012, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-18/business/35488649_1_oil-boom-rigs-oil-
companies/4. 
286 See, e.g., Energwire, September 18, 2013 Methane-spewing “super-emitters” stay 
out of gas study’s spotlight,  
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2013/09/18/stories/1059987397 and on file with author 
287 From the standpoint of a human flourishing value, there may also be waste in 
flaring or leaking the gas instead of using it to heat 500,000 homes because the urgency of 
providing heat is greater than the urgency of cheaply burning off gas. However, adopting 
this human flourishing value would necessitate abandoning the development-driving 
framework and possibly adopting a sustainability measure instead. If this human-
flourishing concern is an accurate reflection of prevailing societal value, then oil and gas 
anti-waste provisions would need to make such a shift.  
However, if economic efficiency is still the primary societal value used to measure 
waste of oil and gas resources (i.e. if development-driving measures are still appropriate), 
then flaring gas rather than using it to heat homes is not necessarily wasteful. Assuming 
that all costs have been internalized, if the opportunity cost in capturing and processing the 
gas is greater than the benefit of flaring the gas and more quickly extracting the more-
valuable oil, then it is economically efficient to flare the gas instead of heating homes with 
it. Thus from an economic standpoint, there would not be waste. This same line of thinking 
appears to animate the flaring practice on the Bakken shale; however, as discussed in the 
main text above, not all costs have been internalized, so there is market inefficiency leading 
to economic waste.   
288 See ASCHER, supra note 61 at 16. 
24-Mar-14] Anti-Waste 51 
and gas extraction. The solution, then, is to adjust market-facilitating 
measures to internalize the full costs of oil and gas production, just as 
market-facilitating oil and gas doctrines corrected the market inefficiencies 
initially caused by the rule of capture.289 
It is not only market-facilitating measures that require 
reexamination, however; usage-veto provisions can also fall out of step with 
perceived resource contexts and societal values. The no harm rule for water 
law has been criticized in this regard. The rule currently protects stability 
and continuity of water uses by preventing transfer of water rights or 
changes in water uses that would harm downstream appropriators. 
However, economic-efficiency based arguments for water markets contend 
that the no harm rule ossifies current inefficient water uses at the expense of 
conservation or reallocation of water. This debate amounts to a difference in 
values regarding water: for those favoring continuity, particularly of 
cultural identity for agricultural communities that use the water, the no 
harm rule has appeal, whereas those in favor of an economic-efficiency 
would prefer to see the no harm rule replaced with a market-facilitating 
measure that encourages gainful trades of water. While it is beyond the 
ambition of this Article to resolve whether actual societal values tip in favor 
of preserving or repealing the no harm rule, the controversy underscores the 
need to periodically reexamine anti-waste provisions, and this anti-waste 
framework clarifies the scope of the debate.    
Sustainability measures too require reexamination to ensure that 
they still match perceived resource contexts and societal values. For 
example, oak and cedar trees reserved for naval construction or the 
resources subject to rationing during World War II no longer require 
sustainability anti-waste protections because values have shifted or 
perceived resource contexts ceases to cause concern with overuse. Some 
scholars have suggested that modern sustainability measures, such as the 
ESA,290 should also give way and shift to embrace economic-efficiency 
values.291 Again, though this Article does not aspire to pass on the merits of 
these proposals, it hopefully clarifies what is at stake by grounding them in 
the context of the broader legal anti-waste structure.  
                                                 
289 See discussion supra. 
290 It is worth noting that the ESA provides a measure for updating itself in regard to 
perceived resource context. Since the ESA only protects listed endangered species, the 
process of listing and de-listing species responds to perceived scarcity of particular species. 
See generally Endangered Species Act,  16 U.S.C. 1533. See also 
http://www.fws.gov/home/wolfrecovery/.  
291 Additionally, sustainability measures may become outdated if societal values shift 
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Finally, perceived resource context and societal values may call for 
new anti-waste measures for resources that have previously been 
unaddressed. To take one example, anti-waste measures appear appropriate 
to encourage distributed generation renewable energy projects.292 
Distributed generation sources are on-site electrical generation facilities 
linked closely with their ultimate uses; solar panels or windmills on urban 
rooftops is a frequently-used example.293 Since renewable-energy is largely 
perceived as under-used and under developed, and since these distributed 
generation projects can offer great societal advantages,294 then failing to 
develop these projects could constitute a form of waste under a variety of 
values including economic efficiency, human flourishing, future 
generations, and ecological concerns.295 However, a market-facilitating 
anti-waste structure appears most suited to the current condition of 
distributed generation, particularly given the market failures that currently 
stand in the way of distributed-generation development.296 Thus, just as the 
mill acts instituted a mechanism to increase water power production, a 
development driving regime may be appropriate to combat the under-use of 
distributed generation of renewable energy,297 and like the prior 
appropriation doctrine considered any undiverted water reaching the ocean 
to be wasted, so might the law consider it wasteful to allow unused sunlight 
to hit a rooftop.  
 
B. Adaptability of Waste 
 
In addition to offering a tool for analyzing individual anti-waste 
doctrines, the waste framework provides broader insight regarding how 
anti-waste provisions function collectively and cumulatively. This 
perspective highlights waste’s role as an adaptable element in our property 
system. 
Legally cognizable waste responds to the inputs of perceived 
resource context and specific societal values, and as these inputs change, so 
do conceptions of waste and attendant anti-waste measures. The examples 
discussed in Part III detailed how over time various different anti-waste 
regimes might govern the same resource (as with landlord-tenant waste), 
how a single resource (such as water) may have various aspects managed 
                                                 
292 See Pappas, supra note 233. While this paragraph focuses on distributed generation 
renewable energy projects, the same argument may be made for microgrids, energy 
efficiency measures, water efficiency measures, and water reuse measures. 
293 See id.; Outka, supra note 269 at 253. 
294 See Pappas, supra note 233. 
295 Cf. id. 
296 See id. 
297 Cf. id.  
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through different anti-waste measures and how some resources (such as 
historic naval reserves of oak and cedar trees) may no longer require anti-
waste provisions.  
As a result of this variability, anti-waste measures are less 
predictable than other property doctrines, which generally provide lasting, 
stable298 expectations.299 This decreased predictability comes with a cost; 
anti-waste measures can disturb reliance interests and expectations or even 
shift entitlements altogether.300 However, this variability also brings 
benefits. While most property doctrines do not react nimbly to new or 
changing resource scenarios,301 relatively mercurial anti-waste provisions 
are more responsive, shifting with context and values. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that over the American legal experience, the core concepts of 
property have not changed nearly as drastically as have conceptions of 
waste and anti-waste measures.302 By responding to changing contexts and 
values, anti-waste measures inject property law with an element of 
adaptability.  
By considering legal waste holistically and revealing crosscutting 
characteristics like adaptability, the waste framework provides a vantage for 
assessing how waste informs other veins of property, environmental, and 
natural resource law. For example, it contributes a new consideration to the 
body of literature addressing how property rights develop and change over 
time.303 Similarly, since the adaptability of waste laws can shift property 
expectations, the waste framework informs Fifth Amendment takings 
scholarship.304 A global understanding of waste also contributes to 
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301 See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.A (documenting the initial experience with the 
ad coelum doctrine and oil and gas development).  
302 If anti-waste measures shift expectations too quickly or fundamentally, they may 
cause a Fifth Amendment taking of property. However, fuller discussion of the takings 
implications of anti-waste provisions will be reserved for another article. 
303 See generally, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 4-28 
(1989); Demsetz, supra note 16 at 354-59; Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution 
of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002); James E. Krier, Essay, Evolutionary 
Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2009).  
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environmental and natural resources scholarship. For example, since 
shifting anti-waste provisions illustrate “a management policy framework 
every bit as dynamic as the [resources] it seeks to manage,”305 the 
adaptability of anti-waste links with concepts of “adaptive management”306 
of natural resources. Finally, the adaptability of anti-waste provisions 
resonates with scholarship aimed at reconciling climate change adaptations 
with property expectations.307 Thus, the anti-waste framework offers a tool 
for theoretical as well as practical analysis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Anti-waste measures harness the contested concept of waste to 
create adaptable laws that steer property uses. Despite the seemingly 
disparate nature of individual anti-waste laws, they define waste according 
to the common factors of perceived resource context and societal values. 
Anti-waste laws then address waste through three distinct regimes: usage 
vetoes, market-facilitating measures, and sustainability measures. 
Understanding anti-waste laws in light of this framework allows for critical 
evaluation of their practical effectiveness and theoretical implications.  
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